The Department for International Development's bilateral support to primary education : thirteenth report of Session 2010-11 : report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence by unknown
 HC 594  
Published on 23 December 2010 
by authority of the House of Commons 
London: The Stationery Office Limited 
£0.00  
House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts  
The Department for 
International 
Development's 
bilateral support to 
primary education  
Thirteenth Report of Session 2010–11  
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and 
written evidence 
  
Ordered by the House of Commons 
to be printed 14 December 2010  
 
  
The Committee of Public Accounts 
The Committee of Public Accounts is appointed by the House of Commons to 
examine “the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by 
Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid 
before Parliament as the committee may think fit” (Standing Order No 148). 
Current membership 
Rt Hon Margaret Hodge (Labour, Barking) (Chair) 
Mr Richard Bacon (Conservative, South Norfolk) 
Mr Stephen Barclay (Conservative, North East Cambridgeshire) 
Dr Stella Creasy (Labour/Cooperative, Walthamstow)  
Jackie Doyle-Price (Conservative, Thurrock) 
Justine Greening (Conservative, Putney) 
Matthew Hancock (Conservative, West Suffolk) 
Chris Heaton-Harris (Conservative, Daventry) 
Joseph Johnson (Conservative, Orpington) 
Rt Hon Mrs Anne McGuire (Labour, Stirling) 
Mr Austin Mitchell (Labour, Great Grimsby) 
Nick Smith (Labour, Blaenau Gwent) 
Ian Swales (Liberal Democrats, Redcar) 
James Wharton (Conservative, Stockton South) 
 
The following member was also a member of the committee during the 
parliament: 
Eric Joyce (Labour, Falkirk) 
Powers 
Powers of the Committee of Public Accounts are set out in House of Commons 
Standing Orders, principally in SO No 148. These are available on the Internet via 
www.parliament.uk. 
Publication 
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery 
Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press 
notices) are on the Internet at http://www.parliament.uk/pac. A list of Reports of 
the Committee in the present Session is at the back of this volume. 
Committee staff 
The current staff of the Committee is Philip Aylett (Clerk), Lori Verwaerde 
(Senior Committee Assistant), Ian Blair and Michelle Garratty (Committee 
Assistants) and Alex Paterson (Media Officer). 
Contacts 
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk, Committee of Public 
Accounts, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone 
number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5708; the Committee’s email address is 
pubaccom@parliament.uk. 
 
1 
 
Contents 
Report Page 
Summary 3 
Conclusions and Recommendations 5 
1  Driving value for money in aid spend 7 
2  Improving enrolment, completion and attainment in primary education 9 
3  Enhancing the Department’s capacity 11 
 
Formal Minutes 12 
Witnesses 13 
List of printed written evidence 13 
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 14 
 
 

3 
 
Summary 
The previous Government committed the Department for International Development (the 
Department) to rising expenditure on education, reaching at least £1 billion per annum by 
2010-11, within the context of an overall rising aid budget. The coalition Government has 
since committed to increasing the Department’s total aid spending from £7.8 billion in 
2010-11 to £11.5 billion in 2014-15. This represents a real terms increase of roughly one 
third over this spending review period. The Department is currently reviewing how it 
allocates resources across its whole portfolio. 
The Department’s aim has been to improve and expand state primary education, focusing 
mainly on sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. It works largely by influencing and financing 
developing country governments to pursue global Millennium Development Goals. We 
universally support the aims of the Department’s education programme. However we have 
significant concerns about its ability to assess the value for money of its spending. 
The majority of the countries the Department supports have made good progress in 
enrolling a higher proportion of children in primary schools, up from typically 50% or 
lower in the mid-1990s to 70-90% now. The rate of increase in enrolment has been 
particularly strong for girls. Fourteen of the 22 countries the Department supports are on 
track to meet Millennium Development Goals for primary enrolment by 2015.  
We are concerned, however, that the Department cannot adequately attribute impacts to 
its spending and its influence. Even for its largest programmes, such as in India, it typically 
contributes a low proportion of countries’ education spend. In some countries, such as 
Kenya, private schools not supported by the Department account for over half of 
enrolment growth.  
We recognise that choices of where to allocate aid must take into account a range of 
factors. But we were surprised that value for money has not been a primary focus for the 
Department either in allocating its resources or assessing the performance of its education 
programmes. The Department’s rationale for investing in education is that it brings wider 
benefits which support reduction of poverty, but it has placed too much emphasis on 
measuring simply the numbers entering education. The Department has paid less attention 
to how many children attend and complete primary education, and the literacy and 
numeracy they achieve; key areas where limited progress has been made.  
The Department is currently trying to change its approach by building value for money 
criteria into its spending choices. This includes a range of mechanisms to ensure money is 
well spent, such as the establishment of the Independent Commission on Aid Impact. We 
welcome Liz Ditchburn’s appointment as the Director of Value For Money and the 
prominence the Department is now giving to this role. It assured us that it is placing an 
increasing emphasis on quality and attainment in deciding which programmes to support, 
and on measuring important indicators of education delivery against the costs. Until this is 
achieved, we can have little confidence that UK taxpayers’ money is securing the fullest 
benefits for poor people overseas.  
A series of frauds have occurred in the main education programme supported by the 
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Department in Kenya. We are extremely concerned both that the Department may have 
misjudged the risks when it invested and that it did not prevent or detect fraud. The 
Department acknowledged that it needed to learn lessons.  
The Department has set itself the challenge of managing an increasing aid budget whilst 
trying to achieve the lowest management overhead of any major aid donor. But in our view 
it is already showing signs of serious stretch in its capacity. It needs enough capacity in the 
form of education advisers on the ground to obtain good data on cost and performance 
and to use this information to manage its programmes effectively. 
We took evidence from the Department for International Development on the basis of the 
C&AG’s report on the Department’s bilateral support to primary education1. 
 
 
 
1 C&AG's Report, Department for International Development: Bilateral Support to Primary Education, HC (2010-11) 69 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
1. We universally support the case for aid to primary education and welcome the 
significant progress in enrolment, particularly for girls. We heard testimony of 
good work being done, but it is unacceptable to rely largely on selective examples 
and anecdotes to imply overall performance. The majority of countries the 
Department supports are on track to meet global Millennium Development Goals 
for primary enrolment by 2015, with enrolment having risen from typically 50% or 
lower in the mid-1990s to 70-90% now. But the Department lacks a coherent 
framework for assessing the value for money of its aid. The recommendations that 
follow are intended to help the Department better target and manage its aid and so to 
increase its impact. We expect to be informed of clear progress in a year’s time.  
2. The Department has placed insufficient emphasis on value for money in deciding 
where and how to spend. It is implementing a new approach to allocating its funds 
between countries and sectors, including education, and introducing other 
mechanisms to monitor how well aid is spent, including setting up an Independent 
Commission on Aid Impact. The Department told us that this will place a much 
greater emphasis on value for money than under previous arrangements. But it was 
unclear to us how much of a change this represented, as the Department also takes 
into account levels of need in developing countries and wider policy factors such as 
supporting unstable countries. The Department should place value for money at the 
heart of the new approach it is developing as part of its review of how it allocates 
resources. 
3. The Department has contributed to increased enrolment, but cannot clearly 
demonstrate the extent to which this is attributable to UK aid and influence. The 
Department estimates its share of rising enrolment crudely according to the 
proportion of funding it provides. We were unconvinced that growth in enrolment 
would not have occurred without the Department’s investment. The Department 
should analyse the extent to which its investment and influence supplements or 
simply displaces that of other funders, including the recipient governments and the 
private sector.  
4. The Department has had too little focus on the performance of education systems 
and pupil attainment, throughout years of substantial investment. It 
acknowledges that it needs to take a tougher, clearer stance on the importance of 
information on cost and on indicators of education delivery, such as hours of 
teaching delivered and pupil attendance. It has also lacked adequate measures of 
pupil literacy and numeracy. The Department should meet the commitment it gave 
us to have a better series of measures within two years, and should use this 
information to drive improved performance across the education systems it 
supports.  
5. Robust data systems are often absent in developing countries. Where national data 
systems are weak the Department should develop a clear plan to strengthen them. 
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But ultimately, where improvement is insufficient, it should be prepared to use 
alternative means of collecting information or change the way it delivers aid.   
6. There is a risk that the Department does not have enough experts on the ground 
to effectively manage rising aid spending, including in education. The 
Department currently has just 34 education advisers and in key places its capacity is 
already stretched. Its aspiration to increase the total number of education advisers 
appears not to be keeping pace with the planned increase in spend. In deciding how 
many expert staff it needs to manage aid programmes, both at home and overseas, 
the Department should focus on the practical work needed at the front line, to assess 
both the risks and the cost effectiveness of programmes and the capacity it needs at 
the centre to make informed decisions between them.  
7. The Department had assessed the risk of investing in Kenya’s education system as 
manageable, but serious frauds have arisen. The Department acknowledged that it 
needed to learn lessons and is undertaking its own review. In so doing, it should 
evaluate the wider implications for its risk assessment processes and the controls it 
relies on when delivering through other governments’ systems, not just in Kenya.  
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1 Driving value for money in aid spend 
1.The Department for International Development (the Department) has been pursuing 
global Millennium Development Goals, including ensuring education for all by 2015 and 
reducing illiteracy.2 The previous Government committed to increasing the Department’s 
spend on education to at least £1 billion per annum by 2010-11, within the context of an 
overall rising aid budget. The Coalition Government has since agreed a rising overall 
budget for the Department over the next four years, from £7.8 billion in 2010-11 to £11.5 
billion in 2014-15.3 This represents a real term increase of roughly one third over this 
spending review period.4 However the Coalition Government has not said if it will uphold 
the £1 billion annual spend on education as it is less concerned with input targets and 
wants to focus on the results the Department’s country offices can deliver.5 The 
Department’s spend on education declined from £711 million in 2008-09 to £633 million 
in 2009-10, primarily as a result of large declines in bilateral spending in Kenya and India 
and uneven disbursements to the Education for All Fast Track Initiative.6 
2. The Department has worked primarily by supporting developing country governments 
to expand state primary systems and has focused on 22 priority countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia. The Department told us that it uses the money it gives to developing 
country governments to purchase inputs, such as textbooks and classrooms, and to 
influence education policy.7  
3. The Department did not have a framework for assessing the value for money of its aid.8 
It pointed to examples of good work it had done, such as helping to reduce the cost of 
procuring textbooks in India to £2 per child.9 The Department had undertaken work over 
the last two years to increase the focus on results, such as clearer baselines and milestones 
and annual spot checks on performance frameworks.10 However, the Department was 
unable to answer clearly the question of whether its total spending was value for money.11 It 
admitted that it had been weak in looking at whether it had achieved maximum results 
with minimum costs, as it had not looked at the costs, and was seeking to improve.12 The 
Department told us it makes its investment choices taking into account international 
research and evidence on the best rates of return to investments. For example, greater 
 
2 C&AG’s Report, para 1.1 
3 Business Plan 2011-2015, Department for International Development, section D 
4 Department for International Development Spending Review press release, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-
Room/News-Stories/2010/Spending-Review-2010/ 
5 Q 141 
6 Ev 21, Annex B 
7 Q 5 
8 Q 54 
9 Q 28 
10 Q 54 
11 Qq 54 and 71 
12 Qq 54, 74, 176 
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investment in early childhood nutrition in five developing countries to prevent irreversible 
cognitive damage.13 
4. Recently the Department had launched reviews looking at how it gives aid both direct to 
country governments and to other agencies to spend on its behalf. The Department’s 
country offices will have to bid for resources by setting out and costing the results they 
think they can deliver against the Department’s strategic priorities of wealth creation, 
Millennium Development Goal delivery, governance and security, and climate change.14 
The Secretary of State will announce in early 2011 the countries in which the Department 
will operate bilateral aid programmes.15  
5. The Department told us that it is moving towards much more rigorous allocation based 
on value for money when making decisions about how and where to give aid.16 Every 
programme will now have a value for money threshold as part of its objectives which the 
Department will judge its performance against.17 However, the Department has a range of 
other priorities that need to be balanced when deciding where to allocate aid, including 
need (such as enrolling girls), and policy commitments (such as working more in fragile 
states). Some of these priorities may be at odds with a focus on value for money, but the 
Department could not quantify the emphasis it would give to value for money.18 
6. The Department told us that it is strengthening its project design and monitoring. This 
includes improved results frameworks, introduced in February 2009, which strengthen the 
monitoring and measurement of results. It is also in the process of changing its project 
scoring methodology in order to provide stronger results and value for money 
assessments.19  
7. The Department told us that an increase in focus on value for money is emerging in its 
education programmes, although this is work in progress. It is committed to improving 
metrics and the collection and use of unit costs, building the capacity of governments to 
collect better data in the countries it supports, and working with other donors, such as the 
World Bank, to create benchmarks and toolkits.20 In addition, the Department told us it is 
introducing other mechanisms for driving value for money, including the establishment of 
an Independent Commission on Aid Impact that will report directly to Parliament.21 The 
Department’s greater focus on VFM is reflected in the creation of a Director of Value for 
Money role, filled by Liz Ditchburn.22 
 
13 Ev 21 
14 Qq 37 and 83 and Ev 21 
15 Ev 21 
16 Qq 38, 45, 82 and Ev 21 
17 Q 82 
18 Q 81 
19 Ev 21 
20 Q 54 and Ev 21 
21 Qq 138 and 143 
22    Qq 86, 87, 88 
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2 Improving enrolment, completion and 
attainment in primary education 
8. The Department’s aim has been to improve and expand state primary education in 
pursuit of global Millennium Development Goals, including equal enrolment between boys 
and girls.23 Fourteen of the Department’s 22 priority countries are on track to achieve the 
enrolment goal by 2015, with primary enrolment up from typically 50% or lower in the 
mid-1990s to 70-90% now.24 Progress on supporting girls’ enrolment has been particularly 
good, with eight countries having already achieved the goal.25 
9. The Department estimates the number of children it has supported across its priority 
countries using a pro rata calculation according to the proportion of funding it provides. 
For example, the Department claims that it has supported 1.2 million children out of the 60 
million extra children in primary school in India since 2003, as it contributes 2% of the 
total expenditure on education.26 The Department argued that this is a conservative 
estimate because it does not factor in the impact of its influence over recipient countries’ 
policies. However, in Kenya, over 50% of the growth in enrolment is not due to children 
enrolling in free state schools that the Department supports, but into private schools.27  
10. The Department was not able to be clear that there would have been a different 
outcome had it spent nothing on education.28 The Department stated that its choice to put 
money through government systems means it is impossible to identify where its pound is 
in the system.29 The Department has improved its appraisal of projects over the last two 
years, generating clearer baselines against which results can be measured, but recognised 
that it needs to go further.30  
11. Measures of education activity in schools, such as hours taught or pupil attendance, 
rarely featured in the Department’s monitoring frameworks.31 Data on attendance of both 
teachers and pupils were patchy, but where they did exist they were in some cases 
alarming.32 For example, the National Audit Office observed fluctuations in pupil 
attendance from below 50% of the numbers nominally enrolled to over 100%.33 The 
Department has funded some studies, often alongside other donors, to look into 
attendance and also the issue of ghost teachers on state payrolls.34 The Department also 
 
23 C&AG’s Report, para 4 
24 Q 63; C&AG’s Report, para 5 
25 C&AG’s Report, para 2.2 
26 Q 2 
27 Qq 6, 7, 10; C&AG’s Report, para 2.5  
28 Qq 5 and 6 
29 Q 12 
30 Q 54 
31 Q 77; C&AG’s Report, para 2.14  
32 Q 55 
33 C&AG’s Report, para 3.11 
34 Q 55 
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told us it had been working on developing better measures of pupil completion and teacher 
attendance, including working with the National Audit Office on a measure of teaching 
hours delivered and received.35 
12. The Department’s country teams do not routinely collect or analyse examination data 
as an indicator of the outcomes of the education system, but the Department has supported 
the conduct of national learning assessments in some countries.36 It told us it had very 
mixed data on attainment because exam data in most countries is collected only at the end 
of primary schooling, often as a selection tool for entry in to secondary education. As such, 
it is not necessarily an effective measure of what pupils have learnt. The Department has 
begun to invest in introducing early grade reading assessments after the second year of 
primary, as well as helping countries to improve their national assessments at the end of 
primary.37  
13. Where trend data on attainment already exist, they show low standards and little or no 
progress.38 The Department acknowledged that it had made less progress on quality than 
on enrolment, because improving the quality of education, and the outcome experiences 
for children, is much harder than increasing enrolment.39  
14. The Department agreed it needs to take a tougher, clearer stance on the importance of 
cost and service performance information; particularly on indicators of education delivery 
and attainment.40 The Department assured us that where data do not exist, it will invest in 
generating better information.41 It is, for example, already the biggest investor in the 
Education for All Global Monitoring Report, which is trying to build up statistical systems 
in countries where data on the education system are weak.42 The Department gave a 
commitment that in two years time measurement would have improved.43 
 
 
 
 
35 Q 78  
36 Q 77; C&AG’s Report, para 2.9-2.10  
37 Q 77 
38 Q 48; C&AG’s Report, para 2.11  
39 Q 66 
40 Q 44; C&AG’s Report, para 16 
41 Q 52 
42 Q 48 
43 Q 83 
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3  Enhancing the Department’s capacity 
15.  The Department recognised that with a rising aid programme over the next four years 
it will need to hire more education expertise.44 The Department told us it had 34 education 
advisers, 20 of whom are based overseas. Of the 20, two are health advisers who cover 
education and seven cover wider remits.45  
16. In the context of back office administration cuts of 30%, the Treasury has given the 
Department scope to increase numbers of front line staff in country offices. It hopes to 
increase the total number of education advisers to around 40, with at least three-quarters 
based overseas.46 If implemented, this would represent an increase of some 18% compared 
with the 41% overall increase in spending on education the Department had planned. 47 
17. In four years’ time, the Department aims to have the lowest overheads of all the major 
donors - 2%, compared to an industry average of 4.3%.48 The Department assured us that it 
will be able to manage a significant increase in aid spending with only modest increases in 
overall staffing.49  
18. Despite its standard reviews of risk, fraud had been detected in programmes that the 
Department helps fund. In the Kenyan Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) a 
series of frauds were reported in October 2009 following a review carried out by Kenyan 
Government auditors and requested by the World Bank.50 When it carried out a fiduciary 
risk assessment prior to commencing investment in 2005, the Department had identified 
the risks to funding this programme through government systems as medium to high. 
However, it had concluded that these risks were manageable.51  
19. The Department told us that the World Bank took the lead on behalf of all donors for 
monitoring financial management.52 The Department also set out the specific 
arrangements it had in place in relation to its funding of KESSP. The Department had 
commissioned a specific audit looking back from 2006 to 2003 and the Kenyan National 
Audit Office carried out annual audits. The Department confirmed that none of these 
audits found evidence of fraud or serious financial mismanagement until the 2009 review.53 
The Department acknowledged that, despite the financial management arrangements in 
place, something went wrong and that it needs to learn lessons from the experience in 
Kenya. It told us that it is currently undertaking its own review.54 
 
44 Qq 90 and 94 
45 Q 90; C&AG’s Report, para 5.6 
46 Q 94 
47 Q 138; C&AG’s Report, figure 1 
48 Q 96 
49 Q 158 
50 Q 55 
51 Qq 116, 117, 127 
52 Q 127 
53 Ev 21, Annex C 
54 Qq 116, 127 and 133 
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Formal Minutes 
Tuesday 14 December 2010 
Members present: 
Rt Hon Margaret Hodge, in the Chair 
Mr Richard Bacon 
Mr Stephen Barclay 
Dr Stella Creasy 
 
Austin Mitchell
Ian Swales 
James Wharton 
Draft Report (Department for International Development’s bilateral support to primary 
education), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 19 read and agreed to. 
Conclusions and recommendations 1 to 7 read and agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Thirteenth Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report. 
[Adjourned till Wednesday 15 December at 3.00 pm 
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Public Accounts Committee: Evidence Ev 1
Oral evidence
Taken before the Public Accounts Committee
on Wednesday 10 November 2010
Members present:
Margaret Hodge (Chair)
Richard Bacon
Stella Creasy
Matthew Hancock
Chris Heaton-Harris
Joseph Johnson
________________
Amyas Morse, Comptroller and Auditor General, NAO, and Mark Andrews, Director, NAO, gave evidence.
Robert Prideaux, Director of Parliamentary Relations, NAO, and Marius Gallaher, Alternate Treasury
Officer of Accounts, were in attendance.
REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL
Bilateral Support to Primary Education (HC 69)
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Minouche Shafik, Permanent Secretary, Department for International Development; Jo Bourne,
Acting Head of Profession, Department for International Development; and Liz Ditchburn, Director, Value
for Money, Department for International Development, gave evidence.
Q1 Chair: Right. Welcome.
Minouche Shafik: Thank you.
Q2 Chair: Thank you for coming to give us evidence
on this NAO Report. Can I just start the process
going? First of all, clearly, I think, congratulations are
due to DFID, because on the goal that you set
yourself—enrolment in primary education—it appears
that you’re on track to do well, both in terms of
enrolment and gender parity.
The contribution that we make to the national
Governments’ expenditure on education is in figure 6
on page 15. In India, we’re at 2% and we go up the
list to Ethiopia—the list shows the four countries
visited—at 6.8%. In other words, we’re minute. So
how do you know that it’s DFID spending that is
making any difference?
Minouche Shafik: Okay. Very good. If I may just take
one minute, I’ll introduce my colleagues, who I may
draw into some of the answers, if that’s all right. Liz
Ditchburn is our Director for Value for Money in
DFID, and Jo Bourne is our Head of Profession for
Education. If you don’t mind, Chair, I will
occasionally draw them in.
In response to your question, you’re quite right that
typically DFID represents about 5% of the education
budget in a particular country, and I think the NAO
acknowledges that even with 5% we’ve been able to
leverage significant influence on reform in the sector.
When we take credit for particular results, we take our
share. So, for example, India, which you cited, has got
60 million children into school since 2003—it is quite
remarkable over the last 7 years, to get 60 million
children in. DFID’s own contribution to that £60
million was £1.2 million, so we can attribute that.
Anne McGuire
Austin Mitchell
Ian Swales
James Wharton
Q3 Chair: So you just divvy it up?
Minouche Shafik: In a sense, we take our share. We
don’t take credit for the whole outcome, because that
would be unfair.
Q4 Chair: But have you done any work at all to
really assess the impact that you have? The Report is
littered with references to “you think you have the
impact”, but it’s very difficult to pull out of this any
strong evidence—and remember we’re a value-for-
money Committee; that’s where we come from—that
demonstrates that DFID made the difference and that
our money, the taxpayer’s money, invested through
you, made the difference, apart from that crude, “Well,
we’re 1%, therefore 1% of the extra children are down
to us.”
Minouche Shafik: Yes. I think there’s a couple of
ways we can get at that question. One is the pure
quantity. On the pure quantity measure, DFID has got
5 million children into school.
Q5 Chair: You can’t say that. You can say that the
country has increased, but what I’m trying to get from
you, which is why I started by saying it looks to me
a good picture, is how we know whether, if DFID
hadn’t spent a penny, there would be a different
outcome. Do we know?
Minouche Shafik: I think our interventions are at
multiple levels. One is spending the money to actually
pay for the schools, the teachers’ salaries and the
equipment, etc., but there’s another dimension, which
is our influence on the policy agenda. I might let Jo
say a couple of words about some examples in
different countries, and how we have influenced the
way education is done, which is a much wider
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [15-12-2010 15:40] Job: 007448 Unit: PG01
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influence. I’d be happy to give some examples, but
Jo, would you like to start?
Jo Bourne: Well, certainly. One of the things that we
think that we do through our policy leverage is around
leveraging good policy change—for example,
reducing fees or getting rid of fees; we’ve done that
in a number of countries. That has contributed to
increases in enrolment—for example in Mozambique
of 12%, in Kenya of 18% and in Tanzania of 23%.
Something like over a million children, certainly in
Kenya and Tanzania, are in school partly as a result
of our contribution to a policy debate on the removal
of fees. Another area is through technical assistance,
where we might actually help with things like
cleaning up the payroll, so therefore teachers are
getting paid regularly, and are more incentivised to
actually turn up for work.
Q6 Chair: But actually the Kenyan example is very
interesting, because the Report says that—I probably
won’t find the reference now—about half the growth
in enrolment in Kenya is actually not into free
education, but is into private schools that are paid for.
I’m really trying to draw out of you where the
evidence is that you make the difference. Because
when I looked at Kenya, I thought, “Goodness, in half
of the increase in enrolment, people have chosen to
pay to go privately.” So, given that the whole ethos
and the whole drive behind DFID’s policy is saying,
“We’re funding to provide free education,” is that the
right answer? How do we know that’s making a
difference?
Minouche Shafik: In the case of the private education
examples, we’ve actually supported low-cost private
schools in some countries. For example, in Pakistan,
we have funded—
Q7 Chair: Can we focus on Kenya? Let’s focus on
Kenya, because what Jo Bourne said to us is, “We’ve
been able to provide free schools, free places, and
that’s increased enrolment.” What I then asked was,
actually, if you look at the facts given to us about
Kenya in the Report, half of the extra children going
have chosen to pay. Therefore, is it the free schools
policy that drove the way in which we decided to do
funding that increased enrolment? Where’s the
evidence? Where can we draw out the evidence?
Minouche Shafik: I think in terms of Kenya, we did
much more than just pay the bills for eliminating user
fees. Just as a small example, because I happen to
have it with me, we have funded a group in Kenya
who are producing a report so that parents actually
know whether their children are learning. There are
community groups and civil society groups that we
support, which hold the public system to account on
a whole range of quality issues.
Q8 Chris Heaton-Harris: How many of those have
been distributed in Kenya?
Minouche Shafik: I’d have to ask.
Jo Bourne: I’m afraid I don’t know, but we could
find out.
Minouche Shafik: We could easily find out for you.
Q9 Chris Heaton-Harris: I know the region pretty
well, Kenya and Uganda, and you’re distributing it to
parents who generally can’t read, I’d assume.
Minouche Shafik: This is just part of the story. In
addition to that, every school in Kenya has got to
publish on its door how much money it’s got from
central Government and how it’s spent it. The
accountability goes quite far down and quite local,
into local languages, including quite simple
scorecards that are written in the local language; I’ve
just brought some samples which I’d be happy to
pass round.
Q10 Chair: Can I draw you back to the key
question? I’m really sorry. I’m sure this is all really
good stuff, and all of us, politically, are supportive of
trying to get this expenditure, but our job is value
for money, so can I just draw you back to those two
questions? How do you know that the DFID
expenditure actually increased enrolment? Specifically
in Kenya, where we know that half of the children
who went in chose to go privately, how do you know
that your free school policy was the right approach
in terms of growing the number of children who go
to school?
Jo Bourne: I’m not sure it is that half of the children
chose to go privately, but I would say—
Q11 Chair: That’s what it says in the Report.
Jo Bourne: It says 50% of the growth in enrolment
could be attributed to low-cost private schools. Now
low-cost private schools in Kenya are mainly in urban
areas, and in fact I was hearing back from my advisors
recently that the people running one of the
consortiums for low-cost private schools say that it
would be unviable to have a low-cost private school
enterprise in any area, in northern Kenya in particular,
where there are fewer than 125 people per square
kilometre. It’s very much an urban phenomenon. I can
talk a little bit more about the global stats on low-cost
private schools, if that would help.
Q12 Chair: No. How do you know—I’m trying to
get at this—how do you know the DFID money makes
a difference?
Minouche Shafik: I think part of the problem—
perhaps it will help clarify matters if I explain the way
we work—is that DFID does not build its own
schools. We can’t go to Kenya and say, “These
schools are DFID schools.”
Chair: We know that. We know that.
Minouche Shafik: We work through the system, and
so we have to take responsibility for the progress of
the whole system. Because we put our money through
the system, we have to take responsibility. We take
credit for the growth, but also for its failures; we don’t
control the whole system, but our interventions are on
financing but also on policy. To say, “Where is DFID’s
pound in the system?” is an impossible question to
answer.
Q13 Chair: But you must think in terms of value for
money. On education, we’ll come to how much you
actually spent. £1 billion of taxpayers’ money is going
into education. You must be concerned that you’re
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getting best value for it. We’ll follow that up with
further questions. But at the moment, what I’m not
getting out of you in the first 10 minutes of the
questioning this afternoon is any sense of, or comfort
that, the DFID expenditure is really making a
difference.
We can look at the number of children at least
enrolling in schools, and it’s going up. We’re all really
pleased about that. But if you’re going to use your
money sensibly, you’ve got to know where it makes a
difference. You’ve got to know that.
Minouche Shafik: I think that’s absolutely right, and
I think the way we get at the value for money question
is, are we achieving school enrolment at a sensible
price? What is the average cost, for example, in a
particular country?
As an example, one of the things we’ve done is try
to bring down the cost of classroom construction in
countries where we’ve worked. We have found that,
in most countries, if you decentralise classroom
construction, you can bring costs dramatically down.
Those are the kinds of things that our interventions
and our policy work can achieve.
Q14 Stella Creasy: You’ve given two examples, one
about policy around low-cost private schools, and one
around classroom construction. Could you talk a little
bit about what actually achieves those?
Minouche Shafik: Sure. Let me start with the
low-cost private schools. Low-cost private schools
have become much more prevalent in many of the
countries, and we are supporting them in countries
like Pakistan and Nigeria, for example. In Pakistan,
in Punjab, we’ve supported low-cost private schools
whose average costs per pupil are far lower. The main
driver in that case is much lower teacher salaries.
Q15 Stella Creasy: What exactly is the support that
you’ve given that’s achieved that?
Minouche Shafik: We will finance per capitation
grants to those schools.
Q16 Chair: Those aren’t bilateral. This is direct UK
money, from DFID, into a project?
Minouche Shafik: No, it goes to the Government of
Punjab, who then pay the schools per student they
take in.
Q17 Chair: So we’re not supporting the schools; the
Government of Punjab is supporting them.
Minouche Shafik: No, but it’s our financing, it’s our
money. They allocate it; for every additional student
that a school takes, we pay. Now why is it cheaper?
It’s cheaper because in the state sector, the average
teacher gets about £100 a month, and in the private
sector they’re getting about £22. So the average unit
cost per child educated is far less. We think that’s a
good investment and good value for money.
Q18 Chair: Can I get this quite clear? We say in the
Punjab, “You can have £x of British taxpayers’ money
if you invest it, and we tell you that you must invest
it in a, b, and c”? Do we do that?
Jo Bourne: We ring-fence it.
Minouche Shafik: Absolutely, yes, absolutely.
Q19 Joseph Johnson: How much of the DFID
budget is spent on supporting these low-cost private
schools, as a percentage?
Minouche Shafik: It’s quite small. It’s mainly the
programmes in Punjab and Nigeria.
Q20 Joseph Johnson: So it’s tiny in the context of a
£1 billion budget, let’s be realistic.
Minouche Shafik: Yes. Yes, its small in the context
of a hundreds of millions of pounds budget.
Q21 Joseph Johnson: So honestly, you can’t take
any credit, can you, for the enrolment that’s been
generated through the private sector.
Minouche Shafik: No, we don’t. The 5 million
number includes the total, including both state and
private. So we’re not taking credit for something we
didn’t finance.
Q22 Stella Creasy: Your initial discussion was about
how you had used the finances that you put in to lever
particular policy outcomes. Is that a fair assessment
of what you are saying?
Minouche Shafik: That’s correct.
Q23 Stella Creasy: Okay. Are you the only country
investing in those kinds of policy outcomes?
Minouche Shafik: Well, we are the second largest
financier of education in low-income countries, so we
are quite a big player. The largest would be the
World Bank.
Q24 Stella Creasy: Okay. So you’re not the only
one. How do you attribute that change, and that
increase in enrolment, to the influence of British
taxpayers’ money, saying, “You can have it in this
particular format, for these particular functions only,”
versus what any other funder or donor may do?
Minouche Shafik: If I can be more specific, that
might help clarify things. For example, you asked
about classrooms and how we bring classroom sizes
down. We have found that, per metre squared,
constructing a classroom that’s procured through a
central Government mechanism costs about $269 per
metre squared. If we do it locally and delegate it to
local communities, we can bring the cost down to
about $95 per metre squared.
As a result of that, we have worked in Kenya to
provide construction grants to local communities for
4,686 schools and trained 23,000 school management
committees to manage that money, thereby reducing
the cost of school construction in Kenya by about a
third. It’s a very specific example.
Q25 Stella Creasy: And I appreciate that example,
but my actual question was about how you know that
that change in policy was driven by UK taxpayers’
money, as opposed to other donors? Or are other
donors funding different types of ways of working,
and the only way that you can attribute this increase
in enrolment in private schools is to the way that the
British money has been funded?
Minouche Shafik: The way we work with our
partners is that we agree things together. Say, in this
case, “We think that in Kenya local procurement of
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [15-12-2010 15:40] Job: 007448 Unit: PG01
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/007448/007448_w001_Memoranda from Minouche Shafik.xml
Ev 4 Public Accounts Committee: Evidence
10 November 2010 Department for International Development
schools is cheaper and better value for money. We’re
going to put our money behind that, and we’re going
to pool our resources into it together.” The World
Bank might put in a pot—in the case of Kenya, the
World Bank and us did it together. We pooled our
resources, and therefore achieved that outcome.
Q26 Stella Creasy: So out of that 5 million increase
in enrolment, proportionate to the amount of money
you give—
Minouche Shafik: That’s correct.
Q27 Stella Creasy: That seems rather odd in terms
of ways of working as opposed to actual funding of
particular types of schools. Do you see what I mean?
The blurring between policy processes and ways of
working, as opposed to funding particular schools or
particular procurement processes, seems rather
difficult. I don’t know how you untangle that, to be
able to say, “We can definitely account for 5 million,
the World Bank account for 10 million.”
Liz Ditchburn: Can I just clarify how we do the
reporting? When we give a statistic on how many
classrooms have been built through DFID support, or
how many teachers have been trained through DFID
support, we are following this very clear pro rata. We
are only taking a pro rata share of the total finance
that achieved that outcome, that set of outputs. Now
we think that’s quite a conservative estimate, because
it’s basically assuming that we have no additional
leverage and that we have no policy influence; we’re
not claiming any greater share than the direct
financing costs alone. We’re only claiming the
relationship between this much money of the total pot
achieving this many outcomes, therefore we take a
share.
We actually think that’s quite conservative, and a lot
of the reviews on DFID’s performance in the past
have shown that actually we often do have a lot of
influence—often more than some other donors in the
same context. We think that’s quite conservative, but
we think it’s important that we are conservative and
that we don’t over-claim what we’re achieving.
Separately, we are also looking at whether, where we
have a clear policy intervention, we can show through
the way in which we manage that programme or that
project that that’s had an impact. That’s the kind of
evidence that we will be gathering through monitoring
and evaluations, but we would hold that separately,
because we think it’s extremely important that we
don’t over-claim on the direct financing of outputs.
Q28 Ian Swales: I was just trying to get at this
information, and maybe you’ve answered some of it
just now, in reverse, if you like. Some 10% of your
budget goes to India, but in turn, that’s only about 2%
of the education spend in India, according to the
Report. So, unthinkable as it might be, suppose we
hadn’t spent that £70 million last year? What would
have happened to growth in enrolment? What other
measures would have changed if we hadn’t spent that
money last year?
Minouche Shafik: I think the wider benefits of our
engagement, in a place like India, are that, we think,
we’ve managed to bring the costs down in the Indian
programme. For example, we’ve been advising the
Indian Government on how to procure its textbooks
more cheaply, and we’ve managed to bring the cost
down of textbooks in India quite considerably—down
to about £2 per child for primary and £3 for upper
primary. Now, that achievement of bringing the cost
down for textbooks means that the Indian Government
gets more value for money, both from our
contribution, but also from its own funding, which as
you imply is much larger than ours.
Q29 Ian Swales: But £70 million isn’t just about
advice, is it? Clearly that’s going towards real people
and activities.
Minouche Shafik: Funding real things.
Q30 Ian Swales: What other things are happening,
and what would have been the result if they hadn’t
happened? I’m just trying to get at that same
information in reverse.
Minouche Shafik: I understand. I think the power of
our influence is that combination of advice and
money. If we took £70 million and funded a bunch of
DFID schools, we would have £70 million of impact.
We think that pooling our money with that of the
Indian Government and other donors means that we’re
having impact which is multiple times greater.
Q31 Chair: You think. Where’s the evidence?
Minouche Shafik: Well, the evidence is that the
Indian Government is now procuring textbooks at £2
per child, which is a lot cheaper than otherwise.
Chair: Jo, do you want to just pop in on that point?
Q32 Joseph Johnson: The Indian Government’s not
convinced that it actually needs DFID aid, or DFID
support, in any way. In fact, I’m not sure if you’re
aware that Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister,
in August, said, “Peanuts in the context of our total
development expenditure. We don’t require UK aid.
We’ll voluntarily surrender it.”
That’s consistent with policies of previous Indian
Governments, who’ve been actively trying to get rid
of foreign donors. If you remember, in 2004 the BJP
Government got rid of dozens of smaller countries,
leaving just the UK, US and a couple of other bigger
ones. Since which time, of course, the US has said
that it’s walking the last mile.
The result is that the UK—DFID—now has a 29%
share of all ODA assistance to India, which is possibly
disproportionate, given that the UK now represents
3% of the global economy.
Minouche Shafik: Yes.
Q33 Joseph Johnson: So I would say that DFID is
probably not wanted anymore, and it’s not obvious
that really, accounting for only 2% or 2.5% of this
particular budget, we’re capable of making much of a
difference anyway.
Minouche Shafik: To be honest, that’s not what
Finance Minister Mukherjee said to the Secretary of
State and myself in October, and we are in discussions
with the Indian Government at the moment about the
future of the aid programme. It is being reviewed, just
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as we are reviewing all of our country aid programmes
at the moment.
I think the Indian Government has said in the past that
our contribution to its national education programme
has been significant. They still have 8.1 million
children out of school; we’ve contributed to putting
quite a few of those into school. They still have huge
issues on quality; a considerable proportion of Indian
children can’t read a paragraph after four years of
primary education—
Chair: Terrible. We agree this is all—
Q34 Joseph Johnson: Can I just stick on the end of
your point for a second? I guess what I’m driving at,
from a value for money perspective—
Chair: Quite.
Joseph Johnson: When you’re deciding where to
allocate your education pot, as it were, why is India
getting such a large proportion of it? There are many
countries which are needier around the world. Yes, I
know India has a very large population of people
below the poverty line, etc., but there is pretty
compelling evidence that India’s capable of funding
its own development needs, and that to a certain
extent you’re crowding out money that the Indian
Government would otherwise be spending on its own
development, particularly on developing social
infrastructure—schools, hospitals, housing, etc.
Considering that India is a country that has a space
programme, a defence programme, and, above all, a
foreign aid budget of its own of over £1 billion, at
what point does it become imperative for you to think,
“Shouldn’t we be giving this money to other countries
that actually need it more, rather than just take it
because it’s going free?”
Minouche Shafik: Yes. If I may, India has more poor
people than all of sub-Saharan Africa.
Q35 Joseph Johnson: I’ve acknowledged that.
Minouche Shafik: It does not have an aid programme;
it has a programme run by the Export-Import Bank of
India for commercial financing of Indian exporters.
It’s not aid.
Q36 Joseph Johnson: It’s got aid programmes in
Bhutan and Afghanistan.
Minouche Shafik: Yes, those are tiny.
Q37 Joseph Johnson: They’re £1 billion. As big as
your education budget.
Minouche Shafik: The £1 billion number is the export
programme, I believe, of the Reserve Bank of India.
In terms of allocating for results, what we’re doing at
the moment is that the Secretary of State has launched
a review of all our bilateral aid programmes. We are,
for the first time, actually asking all of our heads of
countries to bid for results. So every country will have
to compete, and the programme in India will have to
compete with the programmes in Kenya and Nigeria,
and say, “I can get this many kids into school, and
achieve these kind of completion rates, for this much
money.” We will allocate—
Q38 Chair: So are you moving away from bilateral
to project-based? You’re still going to fund through
Government?
Minouche Shafik: No, we are not moving towards
project-based, but what we are moving towards is a
much more rigorous allocation based on value for
money.
Q39 Ian Swales: If I can just add another point on
India; if we look at figure 4 on page 13, the
percentages are not there, but it would appear, just by
casting my eye down it, that possibly Zambia, but then
India, probably have the lowest proportion of children
not in school, according to this table.
The percentages are not there, but in some countries
such as Nigeria, it looks like over a third of school-age
children are not enrolled, according to this table. India
and Zambia strike me as countries where actually a
huge proportion are enrolled. In other words, the
proportionate issue is much more serious in all the
other countries on that list, which is another way of
looking at this.
Minouche Shafik: As I said, we are in the process of
reviewing our aid programme in India. I think India
had huge progress to make, but they have gotten 60
million children into school in the last seven years,
but they are now reaching the stage where they are
reaching close to universal primary. I think we have
to reassess in that context.
Ian Swales: Okay.
Q40 Matthew Hancock: Thank you. Can I just come
back to this big-picture value for money point? That’s
what this Committee is about—looking at and
scrutinising your value for money, the value for
money that you get out of our taxpayers’ money. On
page 9 in the summary of the Report, you’ll be aware
that it says, “Opportunities to act on warning signs of
cost-effectiveness were not fully identified or grasped.
DFID needs to take a tougher, clearer stance on the
importance of cost and service performance
information.” Could you just confirm that the
Department agreed those two sentences with the
NAO? Just a yes or no.
Minouche Shafik: We had a dispute over paragraph
16.
Q41 Matthew Hancock: But this is an agreed
Report. Did you agree to those two sentences?
Mr Bacon: Did you sign this Report?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, I signed this Report.
Matthew Hancock: Yes. Okay.
Minouche Shafik: But I did send a letter to the NAO
saying we didn’t agree with part of paragraph 16.
Q42 Matthew Hancock: So you don’t agree with it?
This evidence session is based on an agreed Report.
Minouche Shafik: No, no. I did write, and we did
clarify that aspects of the interpretation in paragraph
16 were—
Q43 Chair: Can the NAO help on this, to clarify?
Amyas Morse: Just to be clear, what we seek, when
we’re writing these Reports, is that there’s agreement
on the facts. It’s not necessary for the Department to
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agree our conclusions, which are our own comments.
What we can’t have—and this is long-established
practice in the PAC—is an argument about whether
the facts are being accurately reflected in the Report.
So these aren’t facts.
Q44 Matthew Hancock: Okay. Does DFID need to
take a tougher, clearer stance on the importance of
cost and service performance information?
Minouche Shafik: Yes.
Q45 Matthew Hancock: And what are you doing to
do that?
Minouche Shafik: I’m happy to tell you that. We have
over the last two years actually, with great help from
the NAO, done quite a lot to improve the rigour of
value for money. I think the way we’re trying to run
DFID is that it has to run as an investor in poverty
reduction, and we have to invest in the highest-return
activities in order to maximise poverty reduction.
So we have set up an Investment Committee, whose
sole job is to scrutinise big chunks of our work to
assess value for money. We commissioned the
Education Portfolio Review, which provided the
foundation for the NAO’s Report, in 2009 to look
across 989 education projects that we had funded over
the last six or seven years.
Q46 Chair: And how do you decide if they’re value
for money?
Matthew Hancock: And so what—yes.
Chair: How do you decide?
Minouche Shafik: Sorry, should I—?
Chair: Sorry.
Matthew Hancock: The Chair’s question was—the
Chair’s the Chair.
Chair: We run this in a slightly different way than
you’re used to.
Minouche Shafik: Okay. The way we define value for
money is achieving objectives at minimum cost. The
thing we think we need to do better on, and which we
very much agree with the NAO, is being able to
measure that consistently across countries, because
what it shows is that this is actually quite hard to do.
Q47 Matthew Hancock: Okay. In paragraph 2.9 to
2.12, there are a series of statements about how
“country teams do not routinely collect or analyse
examination data”—this is in terms of attainment, as
opposed to enrolment.
Minouche Shafik: Yes.
Q48 Matthew Hancock: Available data that does
exist “show low standards and little or no progress”,
which is 2.11, and then 2.12, “DFID teams lack
sufficient data to assess the relative importance,” and
presumably this must be a problem that your
Investment Committee has, if you lack sufficient data
to assess the relative importance of different factors
behind low progress. What are you doing to improve
on this lack of information, on which you’re trying to
make cost-effective decisions?
Minouche Shafik: Yes. We are the biggest investor in
the Education for All Global Monitoring Report,
which is trying to build up statistical systems in
countries where data is weak on the education system.
So that’s one. The second thing we’re doing is that
we’re developing benchmarking tools, with the World
Bank, for the education sector to assess value for
money across the sector, so we’ve got some norms to
work with.
Just as an illustration, if you look at the cost of a
classroom in Nigeria versus India, they’ll look like
very different numbers. The reason is that in one
country they might be including the furniture cost in
this cost for the classroom, and in another country
they might not be. We’ve got to unpick that and have
comparable data, and we’re investing quite a lot in
that. We’ve also, as a result of this work, developed
some guidance for all of our staff, for all of our
education advisers, giving them some of these
benchmarks: how much should you be paying for
textbooks globally? How much should you be paying,
looking at teacher salaries?
Q49 Matthew Hancock: And are you then going to
change the amount that you put into different areas,
according to the results of these evaluations?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, absolutely.
Q50 Matthew Hancock: Have you done any of that
yet?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, we have.
Q51 Matthew Hancock: Could you give us some
examples?
Minouche Shafik: Sure. Our Secretary of State has
launched something called the Bilateral Aid Review.
We’re reviewing everything we’re doing across every
country, and they are now bidding for their budgets
on the next four years. They’re doing that on the basis
of results, and based on value for money measures.
Q52 Matthew Hancock: But what about where the
data don’t exist?
Minouche Shafik: Where the data don’t exist, they
have to invest in it, and they have to show us how
they’re going to do that.
Q53 Chris Heaton-Harris: It does say in the Report
that “Only 3% of projects tracked cost-effectiveness
or efficiency.” That might be talking about textbooks
or whatever it might be talking about. It’s 4.4 on
page 32.
I think what we’re trying to say, collectively, is that
we do appreciate the work that you’re trying to do. I
don’t think you need to use the individual statistics
that you’ve reduced the cost of a textbook to $2,
because you can’t measure that. You can’t attribute
that to something that you’ve done, I don’t think. I
think it’s unfair to try to do that.
We just want to know that the amount of money that
you’re spending on education in these countries is
actually adding value to the education system, how
you benchmark that and how you can prove to us that
you’re improving things. This Report, based on what
Matt’s just said and what 4.4 and a whole bunch of
other paragraphs in the Report say, doesn’t really give
us that confidence.
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Minouche Shafik: When we’ve paid for someone
who is a specialist in textbook procurement to advise
a Government on a way to procure textbooks globally
more efficiently, I think we can take some credit for
that result.
Q54 Chair: I think the difficulty we’re having as a
Committee is that there isn’t a framework in which
you can assess value for money. You can pick out a
little example here and there, whether it’s a textbook
or the building of a classroom, but what comes out of
this Report is that there’s been an increase in the
number of children going to school, which we all
welcome. We’ll come back to consider whether it is
enough to measure who just goes—you’ve got to
measure whether they stay, they finish, and they
achieve.
But you’re not giving me the confidence, and you’re
not giving me the confidence even in the answer to
Matt’s question, that you have got a framework, that
you have got it absolutely clear, and that we could
come to you tomorrow on each of the 22 countries,
and say, “How are you really assessing value for
money for the pound of British taxpayers’ money
that’s going in?”
Minouche Shafik: Perhaps I could ask our Director of
Value for Money to describe the framework for you.
Liz Ditchburn: I think the first thing to say is that we
know it is not possible for the whole of DFID to have
a single framework. There is no one metric that is
going to run across the whole of the programme, and
we can hold it up to you and say, “This is it.” What
we have to do is work on two levels. First of all, it’s
about using our money in the right places, on the right
things and to achieve the right ends. On the
aggregate-level allocations, we need to take into
account what the international evidence tells us about
where are the best rates of return to particular
investments, and colleagues might want to say more
about the education specific in that.
What does that international evidence, which we are
also helping to support and build through research and
evaluation, tell us about the right place to spend our
money and the right things to spend it on? When we
come down to the programme level, the actual specific
investment, all programmes have to go through a clear
decision-making process, which involves exactly the
kind of question that the gentleman here asked about
what would happen if we didn’t do it—the
counterfactual.
In the economic appraisal that all projects have to
undergo, we are very clear about what we think would
happen if we didn’t do it, what the evidence is that
we can use about whether it’s likely to be effective or
not, whether it will generate the kind of outcomes that
we’re looking for, and how, in implementation, we
can ensure value for money. There’s value for money
at the allocation level, but then actually there’s a lot
of value for money opportunities in implementation
as well. Are we getting the procurement right? Are
we seizing the opportunities to look at data and adjust
and move forward?
We recognise, and this is what the NAO say, that
we’ve not been as good at this in the past as we need
to be. We’ve spent a lot of effort over the past two
years improving the situation, improving the
processes that people have to go through in terms of
appraisal, in terms of having very clear results
frameworks. Over the last two years, our results
frameworks have improved. We do annual spot
checks, that look at the quality of them, and we are
getting better results frameworks that have clearer
baselines and clearer trajectories with milestones in.
So there’s a lot of work that we’ve already been doing,
but we recognise that we need to go further. We need
to continue to invest in the right sort of metrics. We
need to continue to build the systems in developing
countries that will give that data, and we need to
continue to build the toolkit, the work that’s going on
with the World Bank on the new benchmark. This is
definitely a work in progress, but what we can clearly
show is that we have made a lot of progress over the
last two years, and we have more in the pipeline to
go in.
Q55 Austin Mitchell: Basically, the problem is this:
that you’ve decided to pump money into other
Governments, to support their education budgets. As
soon as you do that, you are reliant on them. Unless
you have a big staff in the country and a big staff in
this country evaluating what’s going on, the fact is
that you can’t know what’s going on. There are some
very alarming things in this Report. For instance,
3.11—this observation presumably is from the
National Audit Office—“Our observation at over 20
schools indicated highly variable attendances, ranging
from below 50% of the numbers nominally enrolled,
to over 100%.” You didn’t know; the NAO finds that
out. You were slow to evaluate roll of attendance as
against enrolment.
Similarly, there’s a figure in here somewhere that
attendance among teachers was over 60%1
non-attendance. That never happened at Wood Bottom
Council School, to my knowledge. But there’s other
alarming figures. You’ve got Malawi, where it says
you and others—“and others” may be the operative
thing—instituted an inquiry and found 700 ghost
teachers. Then it says this is alleged in Sierra Leone,
and other places, and Kenya. Alleged! It should be
examined. We should know that kind of thing, to
know that we’re not wasting our money.
There’s the instance of corruption in Kenya. This is
an inquiry that was instituted by the World Bank in
January 2009. You don’t get to hear of it until
September 2009, months later, and in those months
we’re pumping more money into Kenya. I’ve had an
instance—
Mr Bacon: And you’ve got people on the ground in
Nairobi, because when I was there I met them. Why
does it take nine months for the World Bank to speak
to DFID in Nairobi about that very point?
Austin Mitchell: Let me complete my tirade. I had
an instance of a constituent working for DFID in
Ghana, who came back with whistle-blowing evidence
of corruption in the education budget. He was
promptly fired. There was no inquiry. That man has
not received any justice since. If that is the way
1 C&AG’s report states “teacher absenteeism between 20 and
40 percent in developing countries”. Para 3.9
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whistle-blowers are treated, there’s no faith in your
evaluation of what’s going on.
I think as soon as you’re in the pockets of the
domestic Government, you’re in the pockets of
people—I’ve known Governments in this country
accused of fiddling the figures; I’m sure that we never
did it, but the Conservatives might have. That
accusation is going to be more substantial against
Governments in developing countries. As long as
you’re reliant on them, and pumping money into
them, there’s nothing much you can do, is there?
Minouche Shafik: I wouldn’t agree with that. I think,
if I may be a little more specific on the case of
absenteeism, which you raised, we are quite well
aware of the absenteeism issue, and we are often
involved in supporting monitoring of the issue of
absenteeism. I think the solution for us is to sort out
the ghost teachers. 2
We financed the review of ghost teachers in Sierra
Leone—I believe the number is 76, not 760—and we
made sure that those ghost teachers were eliminated
from the payroll. In southern Sudan, 28,000 teachers
were paid in cash. We financed an electronic payment
system so that they would actually get their pay
electronically, which reduced the scope for corruption
and made sure they got paid. That increased the
likelihood that they were going to show up. It’s
precisely those sorts of systemic interventions that
make Government systems work better.
Q56 Stella Creasy: What was the World Bank doing
that you didn’t do, to pick up what was happening
in Kenya?
Minouche Shafik: We were closely aligned with the
World Bank on that issue, and I think the time—
Q57 Mr Bacon: Sorry, could you repeat that?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, of course. We were working
hand in glove with the World Bank on the Kenya
issue.
Q58 Mr Bacon: In that case, can you explain why—
this was Mr Mitchell’s point—it could have taken
from January 2009 for a major world donor/aid
institution of which we are a subscribing member, the
World Bank, to talk to another one, DFID, on the
ground in Kenya? How could it possibly take from
January until September before DFID first became
aware of evidence of fraud?
Minouche Shafik: I think the gap you’re referring to
was from when it was initiated to when the Report
was completed.
Q59 Mr Bacon: The fraud was identified by the
Kenyan Government, following a review requested by
the World Bank. In January, the World Bank’s Kenyan
office requested a review. It took place over the first
six months, and the review was completed by the
summer, by June. DFID first became aware of
evidence of fraud in September 2009.
Minouche Shafik: I think that’s referring to when the
review was completed and we had hard evidence, as
opposed to allegations.
2 ???
Q60 Mr Bacon: No, the review was completed in
June. I just don’t understand why DFID wasn’t more
on top of this.
Minouche Shafik: The review was completed in
June 2010?
Q61 Mr Bacon: In June 2009. The review was from
January 2009 until June 2009. DFID first became
aware of the problem in September 2009.
Minouche Shafik: Sorry. The review was, I believe,
started in the beginning of 2009 and was completed,
and as soon as we had hard evidence, that’s when we
suspended the programme in September 2009.
Q62 Mr Bacon: Why weren’t you all over it like a
rash yourselves? This is of particular interest to me,
because I was in Kenya in 2006, and at the time there
were a lot of ghost civil servants in the Ministry of
Health, as a result of which DFID withdrew support
into the Ministry of Health. I remember specifically
asking about the position in relation to the Education
Ministry, and being told at the time, “No, no, that’s
not a problem, the Education Department is much
better run, it’s okay.”
Well, it turned out that it might have been at the time,
but it subsequently wasn’t. It took you the best part of
a year—three-quarters of a year—from the alarm
being raised to becoming aware of fraud and then,
presumably, to doing something about it. It just
doesn’t sound to me as if you were very on the ball,
to be honest.
Minouche Shafik: Well, I think we—
Mark Andrews: I think it’s important to clarify our
note to the Committee, which is about the review
launched by the World Bank.
Mr Bacon: Yes.
Mark Andrews: There was a sequence of reviews
across several programmes, not just the programme
that DFID was funding. At that stage as well, the
World Bank was launching a review of activities
because it was supporting governance reform and the
strengthening of internal audit. So it wasn’t, in the
first instance, specifically to identify fraud. Those
discoveries came later in the process.
Chair: But there’s a three-month gap. It’s not that
bad.
Q63 Mrs McGuire: I’m struggling just a wee bit
with the discussion that we’ve had so far, because I
feel as though I can tell you how much it costs to buy
a textbook now in some of our countries, the countries
that we work with, that the payroll systems are better,
and how much it costs to build a classroom.
What I’m struggling with is where we can clearly
identify the outcomes for children involved in this. I
think we have sort of skirted round that a wee bit, and
frankly I think some of your responses have added to
my confusion. Can I ask you to identify where you
actually are on track, or are we on track, with ensuring
that we reach our Millennium Goal ambition of not
just enrolling more children in schools—because I
think that’s an easy exercise; you can turn up on day
one and never be seen again—but actually improving
the educational attainment for children in the countries
that we work with?
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I know that we’re behind in some 10 or 15 of the
countries that we work with, so perhaps we could
have some information on how you are actually
assessing and monitoring that? I’d be pleased if we
could park textbooks and classroom-building to one
side; I think we’ve been round that enough, Madam
Chairman.
Minouche Shafik: Okay, fine. Those responses were
in response to all those questions on value for money,
and we do measure those inputs, but I’m grateful for
your questions and I’ll let Jo say a little bit also about
attainment. In terms of where we are in the countries,
we do have much better results on enrolment, and we
know much more about enrolment. In 14 of the 22
priority countries that DFID works in, they are on
track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of
universal primary education. That’s quite a big
achievement.
Q64 Chair: On track to achieve which goal?
Minouche Shafik: The goal of universal primary
education.
Q65 Chair: No, you’re not answering Anne’s
question. I really, really beg you to answer the
question. You’re on track to achieve the enrolment
goal, but Anne asked you about outcomes for
children, which is different.
Minouche Shafik: I agree, but she also asked about
where they are on the Millennium Development
Goals, and I just wanted to acknowledge that
Chair: No, I want it—say it again, Anne.
Q66 Mrs McGuire: I think we’ll take it as a given
that we have seen an increase in the number of
children enrolled in 14 of the 22 countries. I think
that’s already been exposed by other questions. Tell
me what’s happening in the other countries in terms
of enrolment but also what’s happening in all of the
countries in terms of attainment. I will repeat myself;
I think enrolment, frankly, is the easiest part of this to
deliver in many respects.
Minouche Shafik: Yes. That is true. We have very
mixed data on attainment because most poor countries
do not monitor attainment, except at the end of
primary, so it’s very hard to answer your question.
While I think we’ve made a lot of progress on
quantity, which the NAO Report acknowledges, we’ve
made less progress on quality, because improving the
quality of education, and the outcome experiences for
children, is much harder.
We’ve got evidence, increasingly, on what has worked
in different countries, and I can just, if I may,
summarise some of the recent findings on that. A
recent survey by Kremer and Holla, which reviews all
the randomised trials as to what influences educational
outcomes for children, reveals that actually increasing
investment in existing inputs—teachers, textbooks—
actually has very little impact on outcomes in terms
of educational attainment.
Q67 Mrs McGuire: So the fact that we have
textbooks now only costing £2 as opposed to £3,
according to the survey that you’ve identified, has
very little impact on educational attainment. Is that
what you’re saying or have I misinterpreted that?
Minouche Shafik: No, I think it’s saying that
investing more in that actually doesn’t result in these
improvements. You need a baseline level, you need
a classroom—
Q68 Stella Creasy: It’s a zero-sum game.
Minouche Shafik: Well, the returns are diminishing;
after that it’s not worth it anymore. What it does show
is in respect of changes in pedagogy, and I’ll ask Jo
to say a little bit about that, remedial education and
things that encourage teachers to attend. For example,
there is a programme in India where teachers’ pay is
linked to their being photographed, with a time and
date stamp, with the children every day, and if they
don’t have that photograph they don’t get paid—well,
in those schools, attainment improves, because
teachers turn up more often.
Q69 Mrs McGuire: So that’s something that DFID
are directly involved in?
Minouche Shafik: We have supported that sort of
programme.
Q70 Mrs McGuire: What does “supported” mean?
Minouche Shafik: We’ve worked with the Ministry of
Education in India, so that under its national education
programme it provides support to a camera to be
bought in school so that a photograph can be taken.
Q71 Matthew Hancock: Can I bring us back to the
big picture again? Often, we go down a line of
questioning, and instead of answering the questions,
you give us an example. Some of the examples are
laudable, but when you’re spending £1 billion,
answering our questions on value for money by use
of anecdotes is insufficient.
Paragraph 2.11 says that “Available data”—so this is
the data that you do have, and you’ve recognised that
you don’t have enough, and Miss Ditchburn has said
that you’re trying to improve that, and that’s very
good—“Available data showed low standards and
little or no progress.” You’ve just given us some
examples of learning that has happened on how to
improve standards. What is the Department doing to
make sure that the money that we do spend in future
improves attainment, as opposed to the little or no
progress that the available data shows you as having
made. What changes are happening?
Minouche Shafik: I can give you some examples of
the types of programmes that are being proposed for
the future, which—
Q72 Matthew Hancock: What processes has the
Department put in place to make sure that those
lessons are learned? Examples are fine, but not
relevant in the time available. What processes are in
place?
Liz Ditchburn: The allocations process will now place
a higher emphasis on investments to improve quality
and attainment than it has done in the past. When we
look at the Bilateral Aid Review offers, which have
come up from all the different countries, and we work
out what we can finance and what we can’t finance,
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and what we decide to say we can’t afford to finance
this time, we will be putting a higher emphasis on
quality and attainment than we have done in the past.
We will change, and are changing, our allocation
process and the criteria we use to decide where
resources go, because of that evidence.
Q73 Matthew Hancock: Thank you. Do you think it
was a mistake in the past to have the emphasis in the
place that you moved it from?
Minouche Shafik: I think it has always been difficult
to increase quality. I think every educational system
struggles with that.
Q74 Matthew Hancock: Sorry, that wasn’t my
question. I’m very grateful for your reply, because it
was extremely clear; you’ve just said that you’re
moving the focus in terms of assessing value for
money. Do you think the focus was wrong before?
Minouche Shafik: It was insufficiently focused on
value for money. I would agree with that, yes. I think
that, as we’ve said, in the last two years we have tried
to up the game in the Department on that.
Q75 Matthew Hancock: Do you think that this
change will mean that in future, available data will
show progress, as opposed to little or no progress,
on attainment?
Minouche Shafik: I think step one is to get more
countries to measure attainment before the end of
primary.
Q76 Matthew Hancock: Okay. I’ll just stop you
there, because I’d like to ask the question again. Do
you think that this change that Miss Ditchburn has
very clearly described will mean that in future, instead
of available data showing low standards and little or
no progress, data will show progress?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, because hopefully we will be
able to measure it, because we will be funding more
countries to measure attainment along the way, not
just at the end of primary, as I said.
Matthew Hancock: Thank you.
Q77 James Wharton: I’m quite pleased to hear that
the allocation process is going to put more emphasis
on quality, attainment and the outcomes for these
individuals whom DFID is trying to help. That’s what
we’re talking about at the end of the day—these
individuals whose life prospects could be transformed
by well targeted, well planned investment in
education.
The Report does reference the very significant
economic impact of an extra year of education being
estimated to give about 10% in somebody’s earning
ability over the rest of their life. While it’s all well
and good that the allocation process is going to focus
on quality, what I’d like to explore is how DFID is
actually measuring that. Just to pick a few quotes, this
is from 2.9: “DFID country teams do not routinely
collect or analyse examination data as an indicator of
the outcomes of the education system”, and this is in
2.14: “Measures of educational activity in schools,
such as taught hours or pupil attendance, rarely feature
in DFID monitoring networks.”
If you are going to start saying, “We are allocating
money on the basis of the actual quality of education
delivered to these young people,” how are you going
to do that without sufficient information to make
those judgments?
Minouche Shafik: Well, I think that’s exactly right,
and I think one of the things we have to be doing is
investing in more of that kind of data. I might ask Jo
to say a bit about what we’re doing in that area.
Jo Bourne: First of all, the exam data that does exist
in many countries is often simply there at the end of
primary, in order to select students to go on to
secondary. That’s not necessarily an effective measure
of what children are learning.
One of the things we are working at, both through
our bilateral programme but also with our multilateral
partners so it has a bigger hit, is how we can introduce
early grade reading assessment after two years of
being in primary school, which is the best place in
which to capture where children are failing and put in
any type of remedial effort. We’ll also help countries
on improving their national assessments at the end of
primary—again, to capture what they’re actually
learning. Is that enough on that?
Minouche Shafik: I think there’s an example from
Ethiopia in the Report. It shows quite specifically
where they’ve got a quality improvement programme
which we’re supporting. That is quite a good example
of what we’ll be doing going forward.
Q78 James Wharton: Sorry, again you’ve given
some specific examples of things you want to
measure, which I think is positive. We’ve still not
touched on things like teacher productivity, taught
hours, pupil attendance, which should be relatively
easy—not just to measure, but to factor into your
decision-making process. I suspect that quite a bit of
that information is already out there; it’s just a matter
of bringing it all in. We see bits of information dotted
throughout the Report, some of which would be
relevant. It’s whether it then is a factor in DFID’s
monitoring frameworks and how it makes its
decisions. Are you saying those are going to be
brought in as well—teaching hours, teaching contact?
Minouche Shafik: Yes. We are working with the
NAO on a measure of teaching hours delivered and
received.
Q79 Chair: When’s all this going to be put in place,
just out of interest?
Minouche Shafik: Actually it’s being put in place
now, because the Bilateral Aid Review, in which we
are allocating money to countries, is going on right
now.
Q80 Matthew Hancock: Could I just have one
supplementary on the series of questions I’ve had?
You’ve said that you’re placing more emphasis on
value for money and on performance and attainment.
How much emphasis?
Minouche Shafik: It is the criteria, now.
Q81 Matthew Hancock: So 100% of the emphasis
of where money will be allocated will be down to
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attainment, performance and value for money in the
education standard?
Liz Ditchburn: I don’t think I can answer that
question, because I don’t think that there is a number
that we can put on it and say, “We are going to
increase it by x%.” What we are doing in the Bilateral
Aid Review is looking at a range of things. For
example, one of the strong themes is to increase the
effort on quality and attainment.
Alongside that we have an equally strong priority to
increase the enrolment of girls, and really make
progress on girls’ education. There’s some very
interesting value for money evidence that suggests
you should look at early childhood as one of the key
things that you can do. We have a whole range of
things in the mix, and our job, which is not an easy
one, is to say how we balance all those factors in the
mix, and come up with what we think is the best
package of ways of using our money that we can do.
Q82 Matthew Hancock: I understand that, but if you
say that you’re increasing your focus on it, then you
must have a “from” and a “to”. I appreciate that some
of these are subjective, because there’s clashing,
laudable objectives, but if you’re increasing the focus
on something, you’ve got to increase it from a low
level or a medium level to a high level, or from a very
low level to a reasonably low level. How important
is it?
Minouche Shafik: In every programme, for example,
a value for money threshold will be agreed. So, for
example, a certain level will have to be achieved for
that project to be seen to have achieved its objectives.
That will be explicit now in every programme that
we do.
Q83 Chair: So when we come in two years’ time,
say, to look at this again, you will have a whole series
of measurements for the 20 or 22 countries in which
we invest in primary education—that’s what we’re
looking at now—that will tell us about how people
have completed their courses, teachers have worked
more hours and not been absent for so long, and
outcomes are better. Will you have those measures, so
at least we can look at what’s today and what’s in two
years’ time?
Liz Ditchburn: Yes, we will, in many cases. Whether
the data systems will permit them everywhere—
clearly, that doesn’t change overnight. I wanted to
come back to this, to explain the way we are
managing this set of offers, which we’ve had from all
the DFID offices. Each offer is cast not primarily in
terms of, “I’d like to spend £x million on something”;
it’s cast in terms of “the results that I can achieve”.
Each office is expressing the results it thinks it can
achieve in enrolment, quality and completion,
particularly completion. So they all had to state their
offers, in a sense, against the results. Then they say,
“To achieve that result, I think, with the best
information available now, that it would take £x
million.” We will allocate the money against results,
so that we are going to be able to move to that world
where we are able to say, “Actually, those are the
results we expected to achieve in those countries. We
allocated the money to achieve it. Have we achieved
it or not?” And you will be able to hold us to account.
Q84 Matthew Hancock: And are they all
measurable? All those results that are earmarked?
Chair: They won’t all be 100%.
Jo Bourne: Where the data’s available, yes.
Liz Ditchburn: Across the sectors it’s quite different.
Education and health are more susceptible to
quantification, and we’ve got better measures that we
can use. In some of the sectors, like education and
health, we will have very good quantitative measures.
In some other areas, like governance, security and
conflict, it will be harder to come up with some of
those quantitative measures.
Matthew Hancock: Of course.
Q85 Chris Heaton-Harris: Liz, you’ve given me
amazing confidence, actually, you really have. I’m
slightly concerned about what’s been going on before,
but can you just tell me—I knew I was going to be
impressed, because of your title, Director of Value for
Money. How long have you been in that role?
Liz Ditchburn: I’ve actually only been in that role for
the last three months, but I have been in the same area
for the last four years.
Q86 Chris Heaton-Harris: Was there someone
before you who was Director of Value for Money?
Liz Ditchburn: No, the person before me was called
Director for Finance and Corporate Performance.
Q87 Chris Heaton-Harris: Okay, so is this a new
thing in DFID to try and drive towards value for
money?
Liz Ditchburn: Well, actually, I previously had the
title of Deputy Director for Value for Money, which I
think I should just disclose.
Q88 Chris Heaton-Harris: I’m so pleased you’ve
been promoted.
Minouche Shafik: Her promotion was to reflect the
increase in priority.
Q89 Chris Heaton-Harris: Of all the things you’ve
said, and there have been some fantastic measures
going forward, and reflected across—
Mrs McGuire: Nice try.
Chris Heaton-Harris: It was, wasn’t it?—across the
three of you. Can you maybe tell us how bad it was
two years ago?
Minouche Shafik: How bad was it two years ago?
The truth is we’ve been looking at this issue for a long
time, in close collaboration with the NAO. I think we
always had a focus on results. Where we were weak
before was in not looking at the costs. And that is, I
think, where we’ve tried to up our game a lot, so we
can achieve maximum results with minimum cost, and
it’s that denominator that we were weaker on before
and that we’re trying to strengthen, which is why I go
on in a boring way about textbooks.
Chair: Chris, I think this is getting—Ian.
Q90 Ian Swales: Can I just get back to this
attainment question? At the top of page 35, there’s a
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very interesting paragraph that says: “DFID has 34
education advisors, 20 work overseas, of whom two
are health advisors covering education, and seven
cover wider remits.” So there’s not a massive amount
of education expertise there, and further down it says,
“Most of their time is spent planning, monitoring, and
responding to central DFID requests for information,
influencing national government, and coordinating
interventions with other donors.”
I think all that’s interesting, but the important point to
me is that the World Bank has a similar education
spend, but 162 dedicated education specialists. That
raises a big question about the approach that you’re
taking and also about benchmarking in terms of what
they are achieving, with the same amount of money—
it says here—but a completely different balance in
how they’re spending it.
Minouche Shafik: I’ll say a couple of things and then
ask Jo to say something. I think the contrast with the
World Bank is not quite legitimate, because the World
Bank has other functions. It pulls together global
education data and does other things that we don’t do
and that we rely on it to do, so it’s not directly
comparable.
It also operates in 160 countries, and we’ve focused
on 22, so it is a bit different. Having said that, I think
that, particularly with a rising aid programme, we will
need to hire more education expertise. To manage that
programme responsibly and effectively we are looking
at that, and the Treasury has given us scope within
our Spending Review settlement to hire more
frontline staff.
Q91 Ian Swales: I guess that the supplementary is:
will you be changing the balance between frontline
spending and the bureaucracy that sits behind it?
Minouche Shafik: Like all Government Departments,
we are cutting our back office and our corporate areas
by 30%, but we do have scope to hire more in the
frontline, and Jo is responsible for that.
Chair: So you’re going to have more civil servants,
but not in Whitehall? They’ll be out in the countries?
Minouche Shafik: Yes, that is correct.
Q92 Ian Swales: If we come back in two years, how
many education advisors in the field would you expect
to have, approximately?
Jo Bourne: I hesitate to put an exact number on that,
because we do have to go to recruitment, but there
was actually an advert in yesterday’s Guardian
looking to recruit new education advisors, with a
focus on frontline and particularly on Pakistan—
Mr Bacon: You didn’t think about putting it in a
quality newspaper?
Q93 Matthew Hancock: Or just online. You can put
them online for free.
Jo Bourne: It’s online, and it’s also—
Matthew Hancock: Okay. You don’t need to
subsidise The Guardian. Maybe that’s a value for
money suggestion.
Chair: Or it may not be.
Q94 Ian Swales: The reason why I’m raising this is
that it perhaps points out how we can get greater value
for money from this programme. You are admitting,
then, that you’re going to change the balance. How
many overseas education advisors would we have in
two years’ time?
Jo Bourne: Well, if it was my wish list, I would say
that we should go up to a total number of around
about 40, maybe slightly more, and that at least three-
quarters of them would be based overseas, which is
roughly what we have at the moment. But the other
thing we’ve done is also independently reviewed the
impact of having these advisors who cover more than
one sector, to see whether this is a good model to use
in terms of cost effectiveness, or whether we should
actually have more sectoral expertise. Quite often it
depends on the type of programme that we’re doing.
Q95 Ian Swales: What do the ones who are based
here do?
Jo Bourne: Prepare minutes for briefings like this. We
work essentially on policy. We have a small number
of advisors who are regionally based, so I have one
sitting behind me over here who covers Africa policy
in particular. Then we work on areas such as the
production of value for money guidance notes and
areas like the joint programme with the World Bank
on benchmarking and systems.
Q96 Joseph Johnson: Thanks very much. Just
looking forward again, over the period of the CSR,
DFID’s budget is set to expand really quite
considerably, from £6.3 billion this year to £9.4 billion
by 2014–15. That’s the single biggest increase across
all Government Departments—49% in nominal terms,
37% in real terms.
By 2014–15, you’ll be a pretty chunky Department.
You’ll be bigger than the Home Office; you’ll be
bigger than the Department of Justice. From the
hearings so far, I’m not entirely sure—in fact, I’m not
at all convinced—that you’ve got the capabilities and
corporate experience of measurement, and particularly
of measuring value for money, to enable you to deal
with the substantial increase in your budget, and to
ensure above all that two things don’t happen: that
this money doesn’t get wasted on corporate overheads
at DFID; and that a lot of it doesn’t get blown away
in corruption.
I shall deal with corruption first. Andrew Mitchell,
back in June, ordered an investigation into your
biggest programme, which is the investment in the
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme in India. I’d like
to know what progress you’ve made in the last three
or four months on determining whether that money is
being well spent, in your single biggest programme.
Minouche Shafik: Yes. Happy to. On the corporate
overheads, I think I can reassure you on that front.
DFID’s overheads—administration costs relative to
the size of the programme—were 6% at the last
Spending Review. We’re now at 3%, and by the end
of this Spending Review it will be down to 2%. That
will be the lowest of all major donors. The average in
the industry is about 4.3%, so we will be the lowest
cost in terms of our—
Q97 Chair: That 2% of the larger figure means that
you will grow corporately.
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Minouche Shafik: That’s correct.
Q98 Chair: You’re growing corporately.
Liz Ditchburn: Sorry, can I clarify? We basically have
two operating cost lines, one of which is the pure
admin cost of running the business, and that is going
down; that is where we’re taking the 33% real-terms
cut.
We also have frontline delivery costs, which the
Treasury are allowing us to grow. That can grow to a
ceiling, which could actually be 83% real-terms
growth. The two taken together form our total
operating costs, and that has nearly 10% real-terms
growth built into the total. Within that, the controls
are absolute, and we will have to, and are going to,
reduce the cost of running ourselves, so the additional
resource will all go into frontline delivery.
Q99 Mr Bacon: What’s the cost of running
yourselves, in millions of pounds?
Minouche Shafik: I beg your pardon?
Liz Ditchburn: It goes down from £128 million in this
year; we will go down to £94 million in the final year.
Q100 Mr Bacon: And that employs how many
people at HQ?
Minouche Shafik: Our HQ numbers are—our total
staff is 2,347; the London-based staff are 722.
Liz Ditchburn: Those numbers, though, include—
that’s financed from the total operating cost budget,
so that’s not just the core admin.
Q101 Joseph Johnson: I see from your website that
you’ve published the list of senior civil servant
salaries in DFID, and I commend the Government for
the transparency that enabled that to happen. There
are seven senior civil servants in DFID earning well
over £100,000; there are half a dozen others who are
on, coincidentally, £99,999.
The Prime Minister, as you know, is on £142,000.
There is one member of the senior civil service within
DFID who’s on—I won’t mention any names—
£175,000, 25% more than the PM. This is an aid
Department. I’m wondering whether you’re
demonstrating the right kind of frugality to set an
example to the entire third sector.
Minouche Shafik: Those salaries are completely in
line with civil service norms and have been set by the
Senior Salaries Review Body. Those are completely
in line with the norms. Can I answer your question on
corruption, which I didn’t—
Q102 Joseph Johnson: And Sarva Shiksha
Abhiyan, yes.
Minouche Shafik: You’re quite right. The Secretary
of State launched an inquiry on that one, conducted
by our internal audit and an independent accounting
firm. The results of that inquiry are on our website.
They confirmed that our funding supported legitimate
activities in India, like paying teachers’ salaries and
constructing classrooms, and that there was no
foundation for those allegations.
Q103 Joseph Johnson: But the foundation was
originally a report by the Indian Comptroller and
Auditor General, so you’re disputing his finding?
Minouche Shafik: No, I thought the allegation that
you were referring to was an article in the News of the
World that appeared recently.
Q104 Joseph Johnson: Which was based originally
on a C&AG out of India.
Minouche Shafik: That’s correct. Go ahead.
Liz Ditchburn: Yes, absolutely, the amounts, the
potential exposed to loss across the whole programme,
were the figures quoted, and they came from the
Government of India reports and audits. DFID’s
money is used in that programme against very strong
controls. Basically, money is ring-fenced, earmarked
for particular kinds of expenditure and only released
once that expenditure has been audited by
independent auditors.
Minouche Shafik: Experts.
Liz Ditchburn: And we reimburse. So although the
total pot was subject to those losses, the UK money
was actually very strongly controlled, and what the
inquiry showed was that in almost all cases, that
money had been spent on the purposes for which it
had been intended, so there were very strong controls
in place. I think there was a small amount where
DFID was involved in one of those frauds. There’s an
ongoing prosecution, and we will look for recovery
when that prosecution is closed.
Q105 Joseph Johnson: This is going back to
Austin’s point earlier. There was a substantial time lag
between the Indian report by the C&AG in India,
which was 2005–2006. It happened that The Sun
didn’t pick up on that report, and nor did anybody else
for that matter, until some time later, but DFID
didn’t—
Liz Ditchburn: Actions were taken all the time. The
programme managers were working on each of those
Indian reports as they came out. So it wasn’t that we
were aware of none of that until the recent report.
Q106 Joseph Johnson: But we didn’t get an
investigation until Andrew Mitchell ordered one in
June.
Minouche Shafik: There was an additional
investigation as a result of the News of the World
report.
Q107 Mrs McGuire: So it was monitored
throughout the process?
Minouche Shafik: Yes. That’s correct.
Q108 Mrs McGuire: Was there any point at which
you were unsighted as to what was happening?
Liz Ditchburn: Not that I’m aware of, because those
Indian reports were known to the programme
managers. In fact, the Indian Government were very
active, pursued prosecutions and took action against
those losses. It was actually a very positive sign to us
that the Indian Government was taking that so
seriously.
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Q109 Mrs McGuire: So you’re saying to the
Committee today that you’re confident that, because
British taxpayers’ money was ring-fenced, there was
no undermining of the integrity of that part of the
programme?
Liz Ditchburn: Yes. That’s what the investigation
showed—that the controls were working adequately
and that the UK money was spent for the purposes for
which it was intended.
Mrs McGuire: Thank you.
Q110 Stella Creasy: I want to go back to the
relationship between some of the changes that you’ve
outlined in how you’re going to look at bilateral aid
in the future, and some of the earlier comments you
made about the benefits of the ways in which, when
you work with other countries and you work in a
multilateral approach, these things are going to square
off. I’d be quite interested in your sense of that.
You’re talking about a series of measures that you’re
hoping to put in place. How do they compare to the
measures that other donors use, in terms of
evaluating effectiveness?
Minouche Shafik: In terms of other bilateral donors,
or our multilateral partners?
Q111 Stella Creasy: Obviously we’re not the only
country looking to support primary education, so I’m
looking at how we cross-compare that, as a starting
point.
Minouche Shafik: We’re working quite closely, for
example, on the benchmarking and value for money
analysis with the World Bank, for example. They
provide a sort of pooled intellectual resource for all of
the donor community. So that’s our main interlocutor
on that. But we also work very closely, depending on
the country, with other bilateral donors. It depends on
the country, who they are. Increasingly, much of our
work is pooled, and so the analysis of what we’re
going to do together is shared in the country.
Q112 Stella Creasy: How does that then compare
with what you’re talking about, in a review of the way
in which you conduct bilateral aid? Is that more likely
to help that collaborative process, or hinder it?
Minouche Shafik: Because of the results-based
approach that we’re taking for future allocations—is
that the question?
Stella Creasy: Yes.
Minouche Shafik: To be honest, I think we’re a little
bit at the forefront of this kind of approach, where
we’re allocating resources based on results. We’ve had
a series of delegations from other countries who’ve
come to see us—the Canadians, the Australians, the
Germans—to find out what we’re doing, because it is
somewhat different and innovative.
We’re taking this approach not just with the bilateral
programme, but with our multilateral investments, so
we’ve just reviewed 43 of the multilaterals in the
system, and we’ve rated them, their performance, in
terms of a whole set of criteria. We’ve told them we’re
going to link our funding to their performance.
Q113 Stella Creasy: So when you say you’re at the
forefront of this way of working, how do you think it’s
going to influence this way of working in the future, if
it’s not something that other countries share? Is that
going to make the aid that we contribute to
multilateral programmes more or less effective?
Minouche Shafik: I think so far, what other countries
have told us is they are watching us very closely—
particularly on the multilateral side, where they want
to know, “Do you think the World Bank delivers better
educational investments than the Fast-track Initiative
versus the Asian Development Bank?” They’ve told
us they are watching us closely so they can learn and
follow.
Jo Bourne: If I could just add a very specific
example, this week we are in the process of
negotiating, through the Fast-track Initiative Board, a
new results framework for funding that is spent
through the Fast-track Initiative. Again, we’re at the
forefront of actually influencing better behaviour.
Q114 Stella Creasy: And how are the countries in
which you’re actually funding work responding to this
process? Because presumably they have their own
measures of effectiveness of their own spending
programmes?
Minouche Shafik: Yes.
Liz Ditchburn: This is just the reality of the way in
which we work, and everybody in a DFID country
office is working in collaboration with other partners,
whether they be Government or other donors or
non-governmental.
You’re absolutely right; that does mean that we can’t
just impose a UK view and say, “We will use that
measure.” In effect, we have to argue the case, and
the situation in which we find ourselves now is that
we’ve been asking these questions in a quite hard way
for the last two years. But actually other donors are
now coming to exactly the same point; all donors are
under the same sorts of pressures to deliver value for
money for their constituencies.
What we’re finding is that people are saying, “Yes, we
are facing the same problems too, we’re being asked
the same questions by our Parliaments.” If we have
some of the guidance and some of the thinking at a
level that is slightly more developed than others, then
they’re saying, “Right, okay, let’s move forward.”
But you’re absolutely right—it’s a negotiation in each
case, whether it’s a programme or with Government
or whatever. We have to make the case that it’s right
that all our funds need to deliver value for money,
and that the way we will do that is by having good
benchmarks and good monitoring frameworks, etc.
But it has to be done through those mechanisms.
Q115 Stella Creasy: Is that standardisation process
going to be easier or harder to do if you have to move
to a project-based process for funding? What you’re
talking about in the review process is that you’re
looking at projects. You said earlier that you’re
looking in the review process for each country to set
out what they could fund and deliver, on a
case-by-case basis. That seems to stand rather against
what you’re talking about.
Liz Ditchburn: No. Each country is putting up its
offers, but they might be delivered through budget
support, through funding a civil society organisation,
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through a pooled fund with other donors or in all sorts
of other ways.
The way in which we describe them—as an “offer”—
doesn’t imply that there’s a project implementation
mechanism sitting there. It’s about whatever—they
will express the results offer, and they will say what
is the mechanism through which they’re going to
deliver, but it will be very similar to the sorts of
mechanisms that we’ve used before. It’s not about
changing to a set of projects.
Stella Creasy: Right.
Q116 Mr Bacon: I’d just like to raise two points.
First, I actually don’t know whether to be reassured
or horrified that you’re now looking at results in
deciding how to allocate your funds, because it does
beg a rather large question about what you—and, if
what you say is correct, the Canadians, Australians
and everyone else—have been doing in this aid
community for years.
I’m looking at our briefing from the National Audit
Office, which describes your Department as having
“only fragmentary evidence on the efficiency and
cost-effectiveness of the education systems it
supports.” If you were to delete the words “education
systems”, and just put “fragmentary evidence on the
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of what it supports”,
that would more or less cover any DFID hearing that
I’ve attended over the last nine years that I’ve been
on this Committee, frankly.
It’s astonishing to me that you’re only now beginning
to think about, in the international aid community—
and you describe yourself as a pioneer—allocating on
the basis of checking what the results of what you’re
doing are like. It also doesn’t sound to me entirely
accurate, frankly, because the Clinton-Hunter
Initiative and the Gates Foundation have been doing
that for a long, long time.
Anyway, that wasn’t a question; it was what Mr
Mitchell—who’s gone—would have called a tirade.
So I’m tirading on his behalf, but I want to ask Miss
Ditchburn a question about controls. You said earlier,
I think in relation to the Indian case that Mr Johnson
raised, that the controls worked. I’d like to bring you
back to Kenya, because the internal audit report I
referred to, which came out in October 2009,
identified a series of controls that didn’t work
properly, but in your original assessment in 2005—
this was for the Kenyan Education Sector Support
Programme, the KESSP—DFID did identify such
risks, but concluded that they were manageable. Why
did you judge that the risks were manageable?
Liz Ditchburn: One of the most important things we
will need to do is learn lessons from the Kenya
experience. When the full forensic audit is completed,
and we can take stock of that, we will be learning
lessons. We will need to look at whether our
assessments failed, whether our monitoring failed, or
whether those were right and other things changed. So
we absolutely will need to learn lessons. If I can just
explain a bit about the kind of assurances we had in
place, and we will now need to reflect on—
Q117 Mr Bacon: I’m really interested in why DFID
came to the conclusion that the risks were
manageable. You identified some risks, including the
fact that the overall risk rating for the programme was
medium to high, and the risks included procurement,
internal controls, accountability, corruption, technical
capacity and so on, but you described the track record
for projects in the education sector as being excellent,
and you believed that the situation was manageable.
“We believe this is manageable,” you said at the time.
Now, on what basis did you say, “We believe this is
manageable?” That’s what I want to know. What was
the evidence?
Liz Ditchburn: We carried out a full fiduciary risk
assessment, which was externally scrutinised; we have
external scrutiny on all our fiduciary risk assessments,
because we think it’s important that there are others
than DFID who look at our assessments and see if the
assessments can be justified on the basis of the
evidence. So, on the basis of a full fiduciary risk
assessment, which was externally scrutinised—
Q118 Mr Bacon: By whom?
Liz Ditchburn: We use a contractor.
Q119 Mr Bacon: Who?
Liz Ditchburn: It’s OPM. Oxford Policy
Management, who are public financial management
experts.
Q120 Mr Bacon: Right. They’re a consulting firm?
Liz Ditchburn: They’re a consulting firm. They were
appointed competitively.
Q121 Mr Bacon: How much did you pay them to
give you this advice that the risks were manageable,
by the way?
Liz Ditchburn: They don’t advise us on the level of
risk; they advise on whether our assessment stacks up
with the evidence that’s been presented.
Q122 Chair: They’re not financial people, the
Oxford Policy Management?
Liz Ditchburn: They have public financial
management specialists.
Q123 Chair: They’re public management. I know the
organisation. They come in and deal with change
management issues. They’re not an organisation that
I would bring in to have—
Liz Ditchburn: No, they have—they were appointed
competitively.
Mr Bacon: You’re saying—
Liz Ditchburn: It’s a different—
Q124 Chair: It’s a different area.
Liz Ditchburn: Can I just continue with the processes
we had in place?
Q125 Mr Bacon: I just want to be clear about this,
because you were saying that you validated your
assessment by reference to external scrutiny
Liz Ditchburn: Yes.
Q126 Mr Bacon: As if that somehow helped
improve the point. I want to know how much you paid
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for these external scrutineers, and if you can’t tell us
now, you can always write to us with a note.
Liz Ditchburn: I’d be very happy to. I don’t have the
figure with me, but I’d be very happy to write.
Q127 Mr Bacon: Because it turned out that they
were wrong.
Liz Ditchburn: We don’t yet know, because we don’t
yet know the whole story of what the forensic audit
will tell us, and what lessons we need to learn from
that.
If I can just continue, we carried out a full fiduciary
risk assessment; additionally, DFID commissioned a
specific audit looking back from 2003 to 2006. We
also commissioned, and the Government of Kenya
undertook, a public expenditure tracking survey,
which follows how funds flow through the systems
and whether they end up at the schools where they’re
supposed to go to.
The expenditure on which payments were made was
audited annually by the Kenyan National Audit
Office. Other more focused audits were also done. The
World Bank took the lead on behalf of all donors for
monitoring financial management and was responsible
for reporting back to other donors whether we should
make payments on the basis of the financial
information which they had received because they
were in the lead.
So as my friend from the National Audit Office
pointed out, the fiduciary reviews that the World Bank
carried out were regular reviews that they do; they
weren’t done on the basis of a set of allegations on
which we hadn’t acted. The World Bank also gave
assurance that the Ministry for Education’s financial
management manual was correct and adequate.
The World Bank also carried out regular reviews of
where the financial management standards in the
Ministry of Education were improving. So there is a
lot of evidence that we were drawing our assurance
from. Now clearly, something went wrong because we
now know that frauds were being committed.
Q128 Mr Bacon: Why didn’t the controls work?
Liz Ditchburn: What we have seen so far is that the
kind of audits that took place did not detect what is a
quite sophisticated fraud, which has now been
detected through the fiduciary reviews. What we all
want to do, when we have the full results, is to go
back and say, “Did we apply our tools wrongly? Did
we make a wrong risk assessment?”
Q129 Mr Bacon: Was it ghost teachers or ghost
civil servants?
Liz Ditchburn: Sorry?
Mr Bacon: Was it ghost teachers or ghost civil
servants?
Liz Ditchburn: I think they’re different. I don’t know
the details. It was some quite sophisticated document
forgery. So they were fraudulent claims based on
fraudulent documentation.
Q130 Mr Bacon: There was embezzlement by
Ministry of Education officials, wasn’t there?
Liz Ditchburn: That’s one category, yes.
Q131 Mr Bacon: Were there also ghost teachers?
Liz Ditchburn: I don’t think that’s an issue, ghost
teachers.
Minouche Shafik: No, it was more issues about
fraudulent claims.
Jo Bourne: Fraudulent claims and misuse.
Liz Ditchburn: The losses that were detected in the
fiduciary reviews have been completely recovered.
Our share of those losses has been repaid to us.
Q132 Chair: Recovered from whom?
Liz Ditchburn: From the Kenyan Government.
Minouche Shafik: £120,000
Liz Ditchburn: But—
Q133 Mr Bacon: “But”—you were just going to
say one other thing.
Liz Ditchburn: But we will need to learn lessons and
look at whether our reviews, controls and
management practices need to change as a result of
this.
Q134 Matthew Hancock: I’ve got one related point
about the bigger picture. According to paragraph 5.4
on page 33, there was no evaluation or report into
education over the last four years. Why not?
Minouche Shafik: Well, it was a deliberate choice not
to look at the bilateral programme because we had
launched our own; we had launched the Education
Portfolio Review in 2009. We also knew the NAO
was doing this review in 2010. So we decided to—
Q135 Matthew Hancock: Hold on, but that’s one
year ago and this year; why was there no Report for
four years?
Minouche Shafik: Well, we decided to focus our
evaluation resources on our multilateral investments
in education, which are significant. So we
commissioned a review of the Fast-track Initiative
because we knew this review of the bilateral
programme was going to take place.
Q136 Matthew Hancock: But that doesn’t make
sense, because you didn’t know this review by the
NAO was coming two years ago.
Minouche Shafik: Yes we did.
Liz Ditchburn: We worked with them very closely on
their plans for this.
Q137 Matthew Hancock: So when was this review
set up?
Liz Ditchburn: Mark will know a bit better than me.
Mark Andrews: I think that, two years out, DFID
would have known that we were intending to conduct
this study.
Minouche Shafik: So we were trying to be prudent in
the use of our evaluation resources and spread them
across all of our investments.
Q138 Chair: Can I just move you on to two issues?
I want to raise one and I think Stella and Austin want
to come in afterwards. Jo Johnson said that your
budget is going up by 37% in real terms over this
period. In 2008–09, you spent £711 million moving
up to what was supposed to be £1 billion. Looking at
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [15-12-2010 15:40] Job: 007448 Unit: PG01
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/007448/007448_w001_Memoranda from Minouche Shafik.xml
Public Accounts Committee: Evidence Ev 17
10 November 2010 Department for International Development
your annual report for 2009–10, I see that you spent
£634 million, so your actual expenditure is going
down. Can you explain that and then tell the
Committee how we can have confidence that, if you
are getting this great growth in expenditure, you’ll
spend it—and spend it wisely?
Minouche Shafik: I will just very quickly run through
the mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure
that we spend it wisely. There are five of them. First,
there is this Bilateral Aid Review of telling country
programmes to bid by results. Secondly, there is this
Multilateral Aid Review where we’re rating the
performance of all of our different multilateral
partners, and we have told them we will give them
money based on results.
Thirdly, we have launched a review of all our
humanitarian programmes, some of which have an
education component, which is being led by Lord
Paddy Ashdown. That, too, will give us some
guidance about how we are doing on the
humanitarian side.
Fourthly, we have set up an independent commission
on aid impact which will report directly to Parliament,
independently, on the impact of our programme.
Fifthly, the Secretary of State has launched a
transparency guarantee, so we will be publishing
regularly everything that we do, including the reports
that monitor the performance of our programmes.
Q139 Chair: And how will we know—your
spending went down in 2009–10 on this programme.
Jo Bourne: We think that figure doesn’t actually
reflect the sorts of spending that we would put through
budget support mechanisms, which are usually around
about 20%—
Chair: What does that mean?
Jo Bourne: When we give money, like a block grant,
to a Government for it to spend against its own
priorities; quite often about 20% of that is spent on
education. But when we are trying to calculate how
much money we actually spend on education, that
figure of £634 million doesn’t include it.
Minouche Shafik: That’s just the bilateral—
Q140 Chair: So how much do you think you’ve
spent in 2009–10?
Jo Bourne: I could get back to you on an exact figure,
but I would suggest that it is probably closer to
around £800 million.
Chair: Say again.
Jo Bourne: £800 million would be a guess.
Q141 Chair: So are you confident that you can spend
at the level that you have been set in the CSR? You
are underspending still. My understanding was that
you would be at £1 billion by this year.
Minouche Shafik: Well, the Coalition Government
hasn’t necessarily decided whether it’s going to
uphold that target of £1 billion. What it has said is,
“We are not going to set an arbitrary input target; what
we are going to do is see what the results are that our
countries can deliver and then we will allocate the
money accordingly.”
Q142 Chair: So they’re not committed to a 37%
real-terms increase.
Minouche Shafik: No, that’s the total DFID budget.
Joseph Johnson: That’s the total budget. If it’s going
to spend £9 billion overall—we are talking about
education.
Chair: This is just this bit of it.
Joseph Johnson: Education is just £1 billion. It’s
going to be £9 billion by 2014–15, a chunky
number—bigger than the Home Office, bigger than
the Justice Department.
Stella Creasy: But you’re not sure what it’s going to
be spent on.
Joseph Johnson: Line by line, what the programmes
are, that’s the level of detail that’s coming out.
Q143 Stella Creasy: So what are you planning for?
Minouche Shafik: Well, that’s exactly why we are
doing this bilateral review, this multilateral review and
this humanitarian review, because that is the process
by which we’ll allocate that money to maximum
return.
Q144 Stella Creasy:: So you’re planning by the way
in which you spend it, rather than what you spend it
on, because you are talking about bilateral,
multilateral, or humanitarian.
Minouche Shafik: No, quite the opposite. Each of
those mechanisms will tell us what results they can
deliver. For example, the Fast-track Initiative delivers
primary education as well as our programme in
Bangladesh. We are going to have to make a judgment
about which is the more effective vehicle. Should we
give it to the Fast-track Initiative? Is that a more
effective mechanism in terms of delivering value for
money? Or can our programme, our country office in
Bangladesh, deliver a better result? So that is the
criteria we’ll use.
Q145 Stella Creasy: What’s your expectation of
where that judgment is going to lie?
Minouche Shafik: Well it is hard to say because
Ministers haven’t decided, but if you look at the total
offers we’ve had from our current country
programmes in education, there is potential to deliver
at least 11 million school places and support
11 million children in school.
Q146 Stella Creasy: Sorry, my question wasn’t
about what you were going to deliver, but how you
were going to deliver it. You’re saying that you’re
making a judgment entirely on value for money as to
what format for delivery on education programmes is
the most effective. What’s your assessment of whether
that is likely to be more in bilateral programmes,
multilateral or humanitarian aid?
Minouche Shafik: I understand. I suspect, and again
I don’t want to prejudge Ministers’ judgments—they
have to make those decisions over the coming
months—but I think we’ll be quite tough on some of
the poorly performing multilaterals.
Q147 Stella Creasy: So you’re expecting to do more
bilateral work in future?
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [15-12-2010 15:40] Job: 007448 Unit: PG01
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/007448/007448_w001_Memoranda from Minouche Shafik.xml
Ev 18 Public Accounts Committee: Evidence
10 November 2010 Department for International Development
Minouche Shafik: It is possible. Again, I can’t say
because Ministers have to make those calls in the end.
But based on a preliminary assessment of the
evidence, I think that that may be the outcome.
Q148 Stella Creasy: Where does that leave you in
terms of the other half of the equation? One of the
challenges about doing work is that we can only ever
know 50% because you have got to know what the
donor country that you are doing the work in is doing.
Where does that leave you? If you are looking to work
more through countries’ Governments, how can you
be sure that some of the problems that some of the
people here have set out might not get worse rather
than better? What controls have you got in place for
those bilateral relationships as opposed to
multilateral ones?
Minouche Shafik: The revised mechanisms that Liz
has described, in terms of much more rigour around
outputs, outcomes and value for money thresholds,
will be things we will work with our multilateral
partners.
Q149 Stella Creasy: No, sorry, you said you were
going to do more bilateral work or you think you
might. If that were the scenario that you would go
down—
Liz Ditchburn: I think it is important to clarify that
the bilateral programme doesn’t mean budget support.
Giving funds directly to a partner Government is a
choice that we make about whether that is the right
delivery mechanism in any particular country. The
bilateral programme has within it a whole diverse
range of different ways of delivering aid. What they
have in common is that it comes from one country,
the UK, to another country.
Q150 Stella Creasy: Yes, but I’m trying to tease
something out. We are talking about where that
£9 billion is going to be spent and the mechanism by
which it is going to be spent, and the question we’ve
got today is about bilateral aid and its effectiveness
and value for money.
You’re saying that you think it’s possible that we
could end up undertaking more bilateral programmes
than multilateral ones; that’s fair, from what you’re
saying. But if you’ve just got a direct relationship with
the country that you’re trying to fund and they don’t
reform—all the problems we were talking about with
Kenya—you’re actually more open to corruption than
less if you haven’t got other partner agency to apply
pressure.
Minouche Shafik: We won’t fund countries that don’t
deliver results with value for money.
Q151 Stella Creasy: So there could be a scenario
where you withdraw funding under this new funding
mechanism, from countries where we recognise there
is a need, because you can’t get them to work in the
way in which you want them to. Is that fair?
Liz Ditchburn: If we find ourselves in the situation
where we are not able to continue funding direct
financial support to a Government—and we have
found ourselves in that situation in the past, where we
have had to withhold, suspend or reduce payments—
we need first to look at whether we should continue
to use that money in that same country to achieve the
same ends but through different routes. So for
example where we find we are not able to work
through Government school systems, we can look at
alternative service provision.
Q152 Stella Creasy: Like Zimbabwe, for example.
Liz Ditchburn: So those are the choices that we have.
Q153 Stella Creasy: So you mean the third sector,
for example.
Liz Ditchburn: For example.
Q154 Stella Creasy: How does the third sector then
respond to these measures of the cost-effective
framework that you have set in place? Obviously, that
is quite a high administration process to go through
isn’t it?
Liz Ditchburn: For example, in terms of international
NGOs with whom we work, we are finding that they
also are asking themselves the same questions as us
around value for money. So actually there are NGOs
who are doing extremely good value for money work.
Water Aid does a lot of work in terms of looking at
the cost effectiveness of delivery mechanisms. So I
think this is not something you can say is
characterised in one sector or another.
Q155 Stella Creasy: But it is going to require quite
a lot of administrative process at the front line, isn’t
it, if you are going to go to more bilateral? We will
take more responsibility directly for on-the-ground
administration of those processes, won’t we?
Minouche Shafik: I think it will require good sectoral
expertise and good education experts in the field, and
then good data systems—
Q156 Stella Creasy: Which this Report says you
don’t have.
Liz Ditchburn: Which we’ve explained we have the
finance in place to be able to—
Q157 Stella Creasy: So your funding will go
towards more people on the ground rather than more
programmes?
Minouche Shafik: No, different budgets.
Q158 Stella Creasy: So which is going to increase?
One of them has got to increase, hasn’t it, if you are
going to be able to do all the stuff that we are talking
about with the increased money, to work in this
particular way?
Minouche Shafik: With very modest increases in the
staffing, I think we will be able to manage a
significant increase in the programming.
Chair: Well, we hope so.
Q159 Joseph Johnson: I have a fairly
straightforward question about budget support. Of
your overall programme, how much do you expect
to be straight budget support—i.e. DFID effectively
writing blank cheques to Governments, not
hypothecating it to specific policy areas of education,
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health or whatever? How much is it now? How much
do you expect it is going to be in 2014–15?
Liz Ditchburn: DFID never writes a blank cheque to
a Government. We write cheques to Governments in
exchange for very clear commitments around results.
But we actually give budget support to very few
countries.
Q160 Chair: I think actually we would question that
statement on the basis of evidence you have given us
this afternoon.
Liz Ditchburn: Actually, the NAO has done a review
of budget support, which I am sure they will be better
able to speak about. But anyway, the number of
countries we give budget support to is only about 15
at the moment.
Q161 Joseph Johnson: How much money are you
giving to those countries in the form of budget
support?
Liz Ditchburn: I think general budget support is the
description that you were working to rather than
sector budget support, where we are explicitly
working towards particular sectoral outcomes. So
general budget support was £426 million in 2009–10.
Q162 Chair: Is that education?
Liz Ditchburn: No, that’s general budget support.
Q163 Joseph Johnson: Hang on, that’s just giving
the Treasury a cheque and saying here is some more
money.
Minouche Shafik: In terms of the future, I don’t think
we can answer that until Ministers have taken a view
on resource allocation.
Q164 Joseph Johnson: Right. Can I just delve a tiny
bit more? How much of that £426 million budget
support is currently going to India? Just a cheque—
Minouche Shafik: There’s no general budget support
in India.
Q165 Joseph Johnson: None at all?
Minouche Shafik: It’s all sector support.
Liz Ditchburn: No, it’s zero.
Q166 Joseph Johnson: It’s all state programmes
in—
Minouche Shafik: It goes to the state programmes
and also to sectoral support to education and health.
Liz Ditchburn: The figures for that year, 2009–10,
were zero in general budget support to India and
£52 million in sectoral budget support.
Q167 Joseph Johnson: As we ramp up DFID
spending by getting on for 50% in cash terms over
the next four years, do you expect that number, the
£426 million, to increase quite significantly—by
50%?
Minouche Shafik: Again you’re asking me to
prejudge ministerial choices and I don’t think I can do
that. I think it depends on the results that we get from
different instruments. We are not going into this,
saying, “Which is the instrument we want to use?”
We are going into this saying, “Which instrument
delivers the most results for us?”
I should just clarify that we are aware of the fact that
delivering results in some contexts is much more
expensive. If you’re in a fragile state—it costs much
more to educate a child in rural DRC, where there
is no infrastructure, than it does in urban Ghana, for
example. So we can’t be mechanistic about which is
the cheapest, but the key is whether we are measuring
everything we can measure as well as we can to
maximise impact.
Chair: Right, Richard, the very last one.
Q168 Mr Bacon: I’d like to ask you about which
instruments you’re using. You said earlier, “We’ll be
tough on some of the multilateral programmes.” One
of the instruments you use is the European Union,
because a lot of your money goes through the
European Union.
I am reminded of a sentence that I read in an earlier
NAO Report, when Suma Chakrabarti was Permanent
Secretary. I can’t remember how long you’ve been in
the Department; your CV doesn’t say so. Sorry, as
Permanent Secretary you’ve been in the Department
since November 2004. So it was at least two and a
half or three years ago, and I seem to remember the
figure was 55% of your multilateral support went
through the European Union. Does that sound like an
accurate figure?
Minouche Shafik: It’s a bit less than that, actually.
Q169 Mr Bacon: That’s what I wanted to ask about.
When you referred to the fact, “We’ll be tough on
some of the multilateral programmes”, you’re talking
about the chunk that DFID controls directly and puts
into programmes, either alone or with others. You’re
not talking about the other chunk that goes through to
the European Union are you? That’s correct?
Minouche Shafik: No, that’s not correct because there
are two chunks that go to the European Union. There
is the assessed contribution, over which we have very
little choice because it is budgetised. There is also the
European Development Fund, over which we have a
choice as to how much we give.
Q170 Mr Bacon: That second part would come
under the rubric of, “We’ll be tough on some of the
multilateral programmes”?
Minouche Shafik: Correct.
Q171 Mr Bacon: Good. How much of the first chunk
is obligatory?
Minouche Shafik: I will have to come back to you on
that number. We are responsible for roughly 17 or
18% of the budget; it depends how much Ministers
agree the total pie is and then we have to pay our
share. But it varies—
Q172 Mr Bacon: You don’t know how much in the
current year? Well, what was it in the last full year?
Minouche Shafik: Over the last spending review, it
was about £800 million.
Q173 Mr Bacon: No, I’m talking about in any one
financial year, not in spending review terms. In the
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last full financial year, what did you give to the EU in
obligatory contributions?
Minouche Shafik: Sorry, the voluntary or the
assessed?
Mr Bacon: The reason why I used the word
“obligatory” is because it is different from
“voluntary”.
Minouche Shafik: I’d have to come back to you with
a precise figure. I can give you a ballpark one—it’s
less than £200 million.
Q174 Mr Bacon: You were a teacher at the Wharton
School; that’s the place where people go to be taught
to be investment bankers. I would have thought
numbers were your meat and drink, but you seem to
be quite vague on a lot of them, actually.
Minouche Shafik: I’ve given you lots of numbers
today, but that particular one I don’t have.
Q175 Mr Bacon: But how much money you give to
the EU is a big chunk of your budget.
Minouche Shafik: It is.
Q176 Mr Bacon: What I’d like to know—this was
the question I was coming to and this is my last
question, Chairman. If you are going to be tough on
the multilateral programmes where you do have a
choice—where either you are doing it with other
donors or it is the voluntary bit of the EU—what steps
are you taking, acting with the EU and EU partners,
in relation to the bit where it’s obligatory, where you
have to make a contribution whether you want to or
not?
Because if the record in relation to your own
voluntary and direct stuff is, shall we say, patchy—
you have not been focusing sufficiently on cost
effectiveness and results, as you have admitted this
afternoon—how much greater a problem is that likely
to be in the EU? So what are you doing about that?
Minouche Shafik: I wouldn’t accept the point that
you made earlier that we haven’t focused on results.
What I said was that we focused quite a lot on results,
but we haven’t paid enough attention to cost
effectiveness and value for money. We agree with the
NAO on that. On the EU, it’s a mixed picture. The bit
of the EU, the European Development Fund, which is
voluntary is actually pretty—
Q177 Mr Bacon: With respect, I’m not talking
about—I’ll be getting into Mr Hancock territory, if
I’m not careful; I know he’s gone, but I’ll step in for
him if you like. I didn’t ask you about the voluntary
bit, I’m asking you about the obligatory bit, the bit
that you must pay to the EU.
What are we doing as a British Government to make
sure that our constituents’ taxes that must go through
the EU are being subjected to the same kind of tests
of cost effectiveness as you are beginning to apply
more strongly to the voluntary bit? That’s what I’m
asking.
Minouche Shafik: We lobby very hard in Brussels on
this. I have to concede, though, that I don’t think we
have huge amounts of success because the assessed
contributions have multiple motives, not just
development. Many of them go to the neighbourhood
programmes, which have a very political element and
are not just focused on poverty reduction. So there are
many trade-offs and many other EU member states
have other objectives in those programmes like
reducing migration.
Q178 Mr Bacon: When you say the neighbourhood
programmes, I think of the MED programme and
others like it. You mean that type of thing?
Minouche Shafik: Exactly, Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean.
Mr Bacon: You say you lobby; you make it sound
like we’re some sort of external player knocking on
the window trying to get a hearing. Isn’t this the sort
of thing that’s being discussed in the Council of
Ministers all the time, and in the Commission?
Minouche Shafik: Yes it is.
Q179 Mr Bacon: It’s really rather disturbing to hear
you say we are not likely to have much success. This
is a big chunk of the budget and you are handing it
over, more or less admitting that there is not a lot that
you can do to improve cost-effectiveness. That really
isn’t very satisfactory.
Minouche Shafik: No, we do push very hard on
cost-effectiveness and, as you know, the European
Court of Auditors and others have pressed the EU
very hard on effectiveness. Parts of the EU
programme are cost-effective.
Chair: I think it would be really helpful if we had
a note for this Report on both the quantity and the
mechanisms, the tools you use to ensure cost-
effectiveness.
I am going to draw this to a close. Thank you for
attending. You have caused us concern; I have to say
that to you. You have universal support around the
table for an investment in developing countries in
respect of raising educational standards, which is the
aim of this particular pot of money.
I think, however, that we are extremely concerned at
what we feel is a very lax attitude on ensuring that
there is value—that you try to achieve value—for the
investment of UK taxpayers’ money. I was hearing Jo
Johnson; I hadn’t actually quite twigged the extent of
the increase in aid investment that’s going to take
place under this Government.
There is an enormous risk here, and I think we will
want to return to this in a year or so, if the
Comptroller and Auditor General agrees, so that we
can have confidence that you’ve actually got better at
the job of ensuring that you get value for money for
the taxpayer—an objective that we all share.
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [15-12-2010 15:40] Job: 007448 Unit: PG01
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/007448/007448_w001_Memoranda from Minouche Shafik.xml
Public Accounts Committee: Evidence Ev 21
Written Evidence from Minouche Shafik
BILATERAL SUPPORT TO PRIMARY EDUCATION
I attach the additional information requested by the Committee and minor changes to the oral transcript
as follows:
Annex A—Details of DFID’s funding to the EU;
Annex B—Details of DFID’s Education expenditure in 2009–10;
Annex C—DFID’s work to minimise the risk of fraud in Kenya;
Annex D—Details on the number of school reports distributed in Kenya.
Annex E—Corrections to matters of fact in the oral transcript
Annex F—Log frame template
Annex G—Amended oral transcript with tracked changes
As you discussed with the Comptroller and Auditor General, I would also like to take this opportunity to
set out for you in writing what DFID does to ensure the value for money of its programmes and how we
measure our impact. I hope you will be able to draw on this in your report.
Value for Money in DFID
In DFID we ensure value for money through our bilateral programme in three ways: where we work; what
we do; and how we do it. We have strong systems in place but recognise we need to improve measurement of
cost effectiveness and value for money, as highlighted by the NAG education report. This letter sets out both
our strong existing systems and the improvements we are making to address challenges.
Where We Work
We have always made the decision on where to work on the basis of levels of poverty and the policies of
partner governments as evidence shows that development assistance has the greatest impact in countries with
high levels of poverty and good poverty-reduction policies. The Bilateral Aid Review which the Secretary of
State has just concluded has increased the focus onthe specific results which can be delivered through the UK
development programme in each country. All DFID country teams have set out and costed the results they
could deliver against DFID’s strategic priorities of wealth creation, MDG delivery; governance and security;
and climate change. These offers have been informed by a rigorous evidence base, value for money case and
a focus on promoting the role of girls and women. They have also been subject to peer review. The Secretary
of State will announce early in 2011 the countries in which UK bilateral aid programme will operate.
What we do
DFID decides which development interventions have the greatest impact by taking account of international
research and evidence on the best rates of return for development investments and through specific investment
decisions at the country level. An example of our response to international research is our increased focus on
nutrition in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Nepal and Zimbabwe as a result of research showing that cognitive
damage caused by chronic undernutrition up to the age of two is irreversible. We are strengthening the use of
evidence, commercial awareness, evaluation and value for money (including unit costs) in all programme
decision making, including by introducing a new format for project design documents from January 2011,
based on the rigorous Treasury investment appraisal criteria.
In many of our country programmes we work with governments to strengthen their Public Financial
Management (PFM) systems. Better systems should mean better value for money of all government spending,
not just UK development assistance. Through an international cooperation initiative we helped establish, and
continue to support a framework for assessing standards of PFM has been developed and applied in over 100
countries, including 21 where repeat assessments enable progress to be monitored. Of these, 17 showed a net
improvement and four a decline. Six were DFID priority countries, all of which showed a net improvement.
How we work
There are currently 950 active projects of £1 million and over. Each one of them has a results framework
(Iogframe) to plan, monitor and evaluate the achievement of planned outputs and outcomes. The logframe
contains details of DFID inputs, expected outputs, outcome and impact with indicators to measure achievement.
We introduced an improved logframe in February 2009 (see template attached and example below) to
strengthen the monitoring and measurement of results, including the development of clear indicators, baselines,
milestones and targets.
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Goal Outcome Output Indicator Baseline Target
To improve the To improve Increased access % change in the 38% (source— 48% (2013)
sexual and young people’s of young people number of HIV Sentinal
reproductive utilization of for quality young people Survey Report
health of young sexual and sexual and (male and 2007)
people 10–24 reproductive reproductive female) aged
years in Ghana, health services health services, 15–24 years
especially that in 5 target including STI/ who get tested
of vulnerable districts. HIV/AIDS, for HIV
groups. through youth
friendly facilities
and
organisations.
During the lifetime of the project, regular monitoring and annual project scoring allows us to check our
progress on achieving the outputs, and to re-examine the strength of the relationships between outputs and
outcome, and outcomes and planned impact. Evaluation ensures we learn lessons about what works and how
to implement programmes most effectively. We achieve this through a results chain which has clear linkages
between DFID inputs and development outcomes.
Input: Process: Output: Outcome: Impact:
Resources Use of resources Products and Effects of Long term
committed to generate services behaviour results or
→ → → →to products delivered change change
programme resulting
activities
Labour (health Training of health Trained health workers Increased use of health Reduction in
staff trainers) workers clinics maternal
mortality
We are developing a range of ways of measuring value for money including unit costs at different points in
projects (at input and output levels) and we will change the way we score our projects to provide a stronger
results and value for money assessment in our project monitoring. We are also working with our partner
countries to strengthen government data systems and supporting international data collection, so we can
measure outcomes better. We are working with the National Audit Office to develop a new value for money
metric in education, looking at the cost per hour of teaching delivered and received.
We will learn from increased feedback on what we do by being more transparent than ever before. The UK
Aid Transparency Guarantee launched by the Secretary of State on 3 June 2010 commits the department to
publishing full information about DFID projects and programmes on our website in a way that is user-friendly
and meaningful. Under the Guarantee we will publish detailed project documentation and data for all new
projects, information on results and forward budgets. We are reforming our procurement systems across the
programme to maximise the value of the goods and services we buy.
Measuring DFID’s Impact
DFID can take credit for outputs, eg trained teachers, which occur as a direct result of inputs we are
responsible for (attribution), although we cannot claim direct responsibility for outcomes such as learning,
which can be driven by a number of factors, we record our estimated contribution.
Output level indicators in DFID logframes are directly attributed to DFID and measure what DFID
programmes themselves actually deliver. For projects where DFID is the only provider of funds, logframes
measure actual progress against the indicators (eg the number of teachers trained by the project; the number
of condoms distributed). For joint projects and programmes, including budget support, where DFID is not the
only provider of funds, the logframe tracks the total output, and provides the percentage of funding for that
output which comes from DFID. For example, if DFID provides 40% of funding to a project which delivers
4,500 new sanitation facilities and improves the water supply of 12,000 households, we would attribute 40%
of these totals to DFID: 1,800 sanitation facilities and 4,800 households with an improved water supply. These
are conservative claims as they do not take into account the extent to which we influence government and
donor partners in delivering better development outcomes.
Progress against outcome level standard indicators are at national level, and DFID claims a contribution to
any aggregate improvement. For example, Rwanda’s primary completion rate has risen during the period of
DFID’s engagement in the sector from 45% in 2000 to 75% in 2010. DFID has supported Rwanda through a
combination of general and sector budget support (£171 million) and technical assistance (£18 million) in the
past five years, and policy dialogue.
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Accurate measurement of development impact requires reliable national systems of data collection and
management. In education, we expect our support to national statistics systems (e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone) and
education management information systems (e.g. Rwanda) will deliver better data in the next two years on a
wide range of administrative indicators including national and regional patterns of enrolment, drop-out and
completion. Alongside this we are working with the World Bank to develop a set of benchmarks for cost-
effective education systems and a toolkit to diagnose areas where improvement is needed. This is due to be
finalised and rolled out to DFID and World Bank staff during 2011 and 2012.
Over the next two years we will increase our investment in monitoring learning outcomes in the countries
where we work (through support to national learning assessments and early grade learning assessments) and
policy work with the World Bank. We will also seek to support initiatives which provide transparent information
on learning outcomes, and better enable parents and communities to hold schools to account for education
results.
We are introducing tougher scrutiny. The new independent watchdog—the Independent Commission for Aid
Impact—will gather evidence about the effectiveness of DFID programmes, to ensure we give the public
independently verified evidence about the impact of the aid budget.
29 November 2010
Annex A
DFID FUNDING THROUGH THE EU
Amount of DFID Aid
DFID channels aid through both the European Union budget and the European Development Fund (EDF);
the latter sits outside the EU budget. UK’s share of EU budget development spend is about £800 million per
year. Our share of the EDF is some £400 million per year. The table below has figures for the last three years.
£ millions 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10
1. European Development Fund (voluntary contribution) 280.0 360.2 397.5
2. EC Budget Attribution (obligatory) 711.4 793.7 788.91
Total European Commission 991.4 1153.9 1186.3
Source: Statistics on International Development 2010, DFID, Table 18
Where the EU Allocates its Development Funds
The figures below are for EDF (between 2008–13 and EU budget (2007–13) budget and expenditure.
1. European Development fund
(€22.7 billion or £19.74 billion, 2008–13). EU aid to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 100%
Official Development assistance (ODA)
2. EC Budget
The current EU budget allocations of the main development instruments are2:
Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI)—(€16.9 billion or £14.7 billion, 2007–13). Covers Asia,
Latin America, Central Asia, South Africa and the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen). 97% ODA.
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)—(€11.2 billion or £9.7 billion, 2007–13).
Supports the implementation of the European Development Policy to promote stability and prosperity in
middle income countries bordering the EU to both the east and south. 95% ODA.
Instrument for Pre-Accession—(€11.468 billion or £9.97 billion 2007–13). Assists Croatia, Turkey,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro,
including Kosovo. 90% ODA.
Humanitarian Aid Instrument—(€5.6 billion or £4.9 billion 2007–13). Provides assistance, relief and
protection operations to third countries, including aid to victims of natural disasters, man-made crises such
as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or
man-made disasters. 100% ODA.
What we are doing to Improve Effectiveness
The UK, working with our European partners, is actively engaged in shaping EU towards a stronger focus
on poverty reduction and on improving the quality of aid. At country level, we engage through our DFID
offices or via the UK Embassies with EU delegations during the design and implementation of annual
1 DFID share of EU development budget subject to final audit currently underway
2 This doesn’t account for the totality of the EU budget and expenditure on development instruments but only for the main ones.
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development programmes. The UK also plays an active role in Brussels to influence the EU’s aid through
Management Committee meetings. We are one of twenty seven Member States and this will create barriers to
our level of influencing as compromise is the only solution. We have more influence over the EDF than the
EU budget mainly because of our knowledge, expertise and presence in their focus countries (Africa, Caribbean
and the Pacific).
A lot of work on the reform and results agenda, which the UK has been pushing for, has been underway in
the last 10 years.
— In the past decade the EC has completely overhauled its management of aid as part of bigger
reforms of EC administration: including introducing a coherent development policy, decentralising,
building staff skills and simplifying procedures. In 2000, the EC was described by Clare Short as
the “worst development agency in the world”, now it is said to provide “some of the best
multilateral aid in the world” (Oxfam).
— There has been “very significant improvements in effectiveness” as a result of the reform agenda,
with a much more active EC at field level, more able to respond and engage with other donors
(MOPAN and DAC Peer Review surveys).
— Attention on results and with it, increased cost efficiency has seen the EC drive an agenda for
outcome-based (VfM) conditionalities, especially for budget support which constitutes up to 45%
of EDF geographical funds. These conditionalities indirectly encourage partner countries to look
at VFM issues.
— All EC project proposals are peer-reviewed based on DAC criteria, including cost-efficiency.
Independent project implementation monitoring covers efficiency and this has improved over time
from 58% to 63% in 2009.
— The EC has taken steps to look at efficiency: firstly, with a study comparing EC processes with
key bilateral donors like DFID; secondly, assessing the potential efficiency savings that could be
generated through the implementation of the European aid effectiveness agenda. This study shows
potential efficiency gains of up to €6 billion a year and represents a valuable attempt to identify
areas for improvement.
Although a comprehensive results framework is not in place, constituent parts of it are; and these function
well and are used to steer the organisation. The UK has pushed for a more comprehensive framework to be
developed that pulls together the work on results within the EC, both at headquarters and in country. The EC
has responded with a results brochure for the MDG summit and a more focus on results in their annual report.
We are keen for this to continue and improve to give a better aggregate picture of EC results
Annex B
EDUCATION EXPENDITURE IN 2009–10
The PAC [Q 138 of the draft transcript] raised the issue of the levels of education spending in recent years.
Why has spending declined in 2009–10 compared to 2008–09?
In summary, the main reasons are:
— Lumpy disbursements to the Education for All fast Track Initiative.
— Large declines in bilateral spending in Kenya and India.
DFID’s expenditure in support of education in the financial year 2009–10 was £633 million. This compares
with the total of £711 million for 2008–09 shown in Figure 5, page 14, of the National Audit Office Report:
DFID’s Bilateral Support to Primary Education.
The net drop in expenditure of £78 million between 2009–10 and 2008–09 resulted mainly from the level
of contribution drawn down by the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) in these years against
commitments made by the UK Government. In 2008–09 a sum of £72.3 million was paid to the FTI whereas
in 2009–10 there were no payments at all as FTI still had sufficient funds to cover its commitments.
Additional significant factors in the drop in expenditure between 2009–10 and 2008–09 were reductions in
our bilateral support to education in Kenya over the previous year’s level of expenditure due to the suspension
of bilateral aid, and a reduction of bilateral aid in India as part of a phased reduction in our support.
The net drop in spend caused by these three factors alone was some £116 million. But this was partly offset
by growth in a number of other bilateral and multilateral programmes. A summary table is shown below.
Programme 2008–09 Spend £million 2009–10 Spend £million
Fast Track Initiative 72.3 0
Kenya 34.0 5.4
India 72.4 57.4
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Programme 2008–09 Spend £million 2009–10 Spend £million
Other Bilateral and Multilateral
programmes 532.3 570.2
TOTAL 711.0 633.0
How is DFID spending on education calculated?
DFID calculates total education spend by counting both direct spend on education and attributing a
proportion of other types of spend which contribute to education. This is different to figures published in
DFID’s Statistics on International Development (SID) which do not count all education spend in this way.
The methodology used for both 2008–09 and 2009–10 includes a notional allocation of DFID’s General
Budget Support to the education sector in the same proportion as the recipient government allocates total
resources to education activities. This means, for example, if a government intends to spend 25% of its total
budget on education, 25% of General Budget Support would be attributed to education.
The share of DFID’s core contributions to multilateral agencies that goes to education sectors is estimated
by establishing the proportion of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) each multilateral spends in the
relevant sectors. Multilateral organisations report a breakdown of their commitments to the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) using DAC sector codes. For multilaterals who provide General Budget Support,
we count 20% towards education.
Expenditure on education also includes an imputed share of DFID’s Programme Partnership Agreements for
education (£15.7 million in 2008–09; £16.1 million in 2009–10) and debt relief (£13.6 million in 2008–09;
10.4 million in 2009–10). Debt relief frees up resources in developing countries to support poverty reduction
efforts including directly increasing spending on education. To measure education support from debt relief,
20% of DFID debt relief is counted.
Annex C
DFID’S WORK IN MINIMISING RISKS AND RESPONSE TO
THE KENYA EDUCATION FRAUD
DFID would be content with the publication of the NAO’s Supplementary Brief on fraud in Kenya, which
clearly sets out DFID’s response to the discovery of fraud in KESSP after September 2009. In addition, this
annex sets out relevant events prior to DFID being informed in September 2009 of the fraud.
DFID’s fiduciary risk assessment (FRA) for the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) was
prepared by DFID Kenya advisers in 2005. The conclusions of the FRA were that overall risks were
“moderately high” and that the risk of corruption was “high”, but that there was a “positive trajectory of
change”. DFID’s FRA was agreed by the World Bank and was used in the appraisal of their programme
of support.
After the launch of KESSP, DFID and other donors continued working to strengthen financial management
to mitigate these risks. In addition to deploying experts into key positions, in March 2006 DFID commissioned
a one-off audit of financial management in the Ministry of Education. We also supported an Expenditure
Tracking Study of funds disbursed to schools between 2002 and 2005. These investigations were complemented
by annual audits of KESSP by the Kenyan National Audit Office. None of these audits found evidence of fraud
or serious financial mis-management until the 2009 Ministry of Finance fiduciary review.
A separate country level FRA was prepared for DFID Kenya’s Country Assistance Plan in 2008. This FRA
was independently scrutinised and endorsed by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) at a cost of £1,997.50. The
conclusions of the country level FRA confirmed the findings of the original education FRA that overall risks
were “substantial” and that the risk of corruption was “high”. This FRA informed our assessment of the need
for continuing careful scrutiny of KESSP. No decision about DFID funding for a possible second phase of
KESSP had been taken when the Ministry of Finance fiduciary review was released in September 2009.
The fiduciary reviews commissioned by the World Bank in January 2009 of their 25 programmes in Kenya
were a routine element of the World Bank’s Country Portfolio Performance Review. DFID and other donors
were informed about the reviews and kept up-to-date with progress. The fiduciary reviews were completed in
June 2009 but, on five of the programmes in which large numbers of disbursements were made to local level
institutions (including KESSP), these proved of limited use. DFID, the World Bank and the Kenyan Ministry
of Education then requested an in-depth review of the education programme, covering a larger sample of
schools, to produce robust and actionable recommendations. The in-depth review was started in July 2009 by
the Internal Audit Department of the Kenyan Ministry of Finance with some technical assistance from the
World Bank, but no direct involvement by any donor.
On 21 September, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance informed the Heads of DFID Kenya
and the World Bank that the in-depth fiduciary review had uncovered provisional evidence of financial mis-
management and fraud in KESSP. The Kenyan Finance Minister released details of these allegations to the
press the following day.
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Annex D
DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL REPORTS IN KENYA
At the PAC Hearing on bilateral support to Primary Education the PAC requested details on the numbers of
school reports distributed in Kenya by the group, Uwezu, funded by DFID (question 8 on page 3 of the Oral
Transcript refers).
In Kenya, Uwezo distributed:
— 1,700 versions of their full report;
— 500 CD versions;
— 8,000 summarised/small versions;
— 4,000 A1 ranking posters; and
— 74,600 district report cards.
To put these numbers into context, there are about 10 million primary-school-aged children in Kenya and
about 27,000 primary schools. (Kenya has an 8–4-4 system with eight years of primary education, four years
of secondary education and four years of university level education).
In terms of impact, the Uwezo report was widely reported in the Kenya press, and has led to pressure on
the Ministry of Education to focus more on improving quality, although it is of course too soon to see any
change in outcomes.
Annex E
CORRECTIONS OF MATTERS OF FACT IN THE ORAL TRANSCRIPT
(i) Page 5—Q21—In Minouche Shafik’s response it was stated that “The five million number includes the
total, including both state and private.”
The five million is an estimate based on DFID financing through government systems, and therefore only
counts enrolment in private schools in so much as the government in any particular country subsidises private
schools and includes enrolment in private schools in its national data.
(ii) Page 28—Q139—second response from Jo Bourne should read:
“But when we are trying to calculate how much money we actually spend on education, that figure of
£634 million does include an attributed amount through budget support.”
(See note on education expenditure in Annex C.)
(iii) Page 28, Qs 139 and 140—in Jo Bourne’s responses the amount spent on education in 2009–10 should
be £633 million (see note on education expenditure in Annex C).
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